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Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems
J.B. RUHL*
The American legal system has proven remarkably robust even in the face of
vast and often tumultuous political, social, economic, and technological change.
Yet our system of law is not unlike other complex social, biological, and physical
systems in exhibiting local fragility in the midst of its global robustness.
Understanding how this “robust yet fragile” (RYF) dilemma operates in legal
systems is important to the extent law is expected to assist in managing systemic
risk—the risk of large local or even system-wide failures—in other social systems.
Indeed, legal system failures have been blamed as partly responsible for disasters
such as the recent financial system crisis and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. If we
cannot effectively manage systemic risk within the legal system, how can we expect
the legal system to manage systemic risk elsewhere?
This Article employs a complexity science model of the RYF dilemma to explore
why systemic risk persists in legal systems and how to manage it. Part I defines
complexity in the context of the institutions and instruments that make up the legal
system. Part II defines the five dimensions of robustness that support functionality
of the legal system: (1) reliability, (2) efficiency, (3) scalability, (4) modularity, and
(5) evolvability. Part III then defines system fragility by examining the internal and
external constraints that impede legal system robustness and the fail-safe system
control strategies for managing their effects. With those basic elements of the RYF
dilemma model in place, Part IV defines systemic risk and explores the paradoxical
role of increasingly organized complexity brought about by fail-safe strategies as a
source of legal system failure.
There is no way around the RYF dilemma—some degree of systemic risk is
inherent in any complex adaptive system—but the balance between robustness and
fragility is something we can hope to influence. To explore how, Part V applies the
RYF dilemma model to a concrete systemic risk management context—oil drilling
in the deep Gulf of Mexico. The legal regime governing offshore oil exploration
and extraction has been blamed as contributing to the set of failures that led to the
catastrophic Deepwater Horizon spill and is at the center of reform initiatives.
Using this case study, I argue that the RYF dilemma model provides valuable
insights into how legal systems fail and how to manage legal systemic risk.

* David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law, Vanderbilt University Law
School. I am thankful to Lawrence Baxter, Robin Craig, Rob Fischman, and Daniel Katz for
comments on drafts, to my research assistants Pete Matthews and Will Airhart, and to the
Vanderbilt University Law School for research support. This project also benefitted
tremendously from comments and critiques offered at presentations to the Workshop in
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University–Bloomington, the Society for
Evolutionary Analysis in Law, and the 2012 German Law and Society Association
Conference on Evolution of Law. All views expressed and mistakes made are solely my
own. Please direct any comments or questions to jb.ruhl@vanderbilt.edu.
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Modern institutions and technologies facilitate robustness and
accelerate evolution but enable catastrophes on a scale unimaginable
without them . . . .1
INTRODUCTION
How would you design a legal system to be robust? The American legal system
has proven remarkably enduring even in the face of vast and often tumultuous
political, social, economic, and technological change, so it must be robust. Yet our
history is riddled with crises exposing a pernicious fragility in law revealing itself
at inopportune and unanticipated times and places. Notwithstanding what is
believed to be a secure legal infrastructure for abating and responding to significant
social and economic catastrophes, these crises keep happening and law often not
only fails to come to the rescue, it is frequently deemed to be part of the problem
and in need of reform. I need only mention the financial system crisis and the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill as recent examples.2 Why is that? How can it be that
our legal system is robust and fragile at the same time?

1. David L. Alderson & John C. Doyle, Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their
Implications For Network-Centric Infrastructures, 40 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS,
MAN, & CYBERNETICS 839, 843 (2010).
2. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011)
[hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS] (assessing causes of the financial crisis including failures in
regulation); NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING
(2011) [hereinafter DEEP WATER] (assessing causes of the oil spill including failures in
regulation). See generally infra Part IV.B (financial crisis); Part V (oil spill). For a broad and
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Legal scholars have described our and other legal systems as robust3 or fragile,4
but not usually both. Not surprisingly, as the terms imply, the clear preference is for
being robust.5 Seldom, however, is any content provided to elaborate what it means
for a legal system to be robust or fragile, much less how a legal system can be both
robust and fragile. It helps little to interchange robust with synonyms such as
“strong,” or “healthy,” or “stout” and to define “fragile” as the opposite. What do

thoughtful examination of regulatory failure, including whether it is in fact as responsible for
the financial crisis, the oil spill, and other social and economic calamities as is often claimed
retrospectively, see generally REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
REGULATION (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012).
3. See, e.g., Cai Congyan, China–US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment
Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 457, 490 (2009) (“[G]enerally speaking, Chinese investment can be fairly treated and
protected in the United States where the legal system is robust . . . .”); Carl N. Edwards, In
Search of Legal Scholarship: Strategies for the Integration of Science Into the Practice of
Law, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 33 (1998) (claiming that “[t]he American legal system is
astonishingly responsive yet robust,” but not explaining the difference); James D. Fry,
International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law’s
Unity, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 77, 146 (2007) (“[T]he international legal system seems
to have been sufficiently robust and flexible to have weathered both hot and cold wars of the
past few centuries.”); John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the
Law of Accidents, 1 J. TORT. L., June 2007, at 1, 27 (2007) (“[I]t is the common law system
(in its American variation, at any rate) that has the most robust system of tort law.”).
4. See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in
United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 147 (2000) (referring to “the new and fragile
legal systems of the post-Communist nations of Eastern Europe”); Henry J. Bourguignon,
The Federal Key to the Judiciary Act of 1789, 46 S.C. L. REV. 647, 700 (1995) (“An
effective Supreme Court, however, was needed to hold a fragile Union’s legal system
together . . . .”); Sherri Burr, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Alvarez-Machain Cases:
Recasting International Law, 13 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 105, 105 (2005) (referring to “the fragile
international legal system that formulates customary law”); Tom Parker, Prosecuting
Saddam: The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Evolution of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 899, 905 (2005) (describing “Iraq’s still-fragile legal
system”); William P. Quigley, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Katrina: Human and Civil
Rights Left Behind Again, 81 TUL. L. REV. 955, 968 (2007) (“[T]he New Orleans criminal
legal system, which was fragile before, essentially collapsed after Katrina.”).
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, National Security Advice for a New
Administration: Initial Thoughts, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 227, 238 (2009) (“[A]
central plank [for national security policy] must be a robust international legal system . . . .”);
Benjamin J. Richardson, Is East Asia Industrializing Too Quickly? Environmental
Regulation in Its Special Economic Zones, 22 UCLA PAC. BASIN. L.J. 150, 182 (2004)
(“Singapore was virtually alone in emerging relatively unscathed from the East Asian
financial turmoil because it had a reliable, robust legal system . . . .”); Zhao Xiuwen & Lisa
A. Kloppenberg, Reforming Chinese Arbitration Law and Practices in the Global Economy,
31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 421, 422 (2006) (pointing to “development of a more robust legal
system” as a positive trend in Chinese legal and economic conditions); Yesha Yadav, The
Specter of Sisyphus: Re-Making International Financial Regulation After the Global
Financial Crisis, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 83, 100 (2010) (“[A] sharper focus on the creation
of a robust regulatory architecture at the international level may better support the work of
regulators . . . .”).
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those terms mean when applied to legal systems? More to the point, is there a way
to manage the robustness and fragility of law?
Questions like these are within the domain of complexity science—the study of
complex adaptive systems, systems “in which large networks of components with
no central control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective
behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via learning or
evolution.”6 Although forged in the physical sciences, social scientists have begun
to incorporate complexity science to better understand and manage complex social
systems, with law being no exception.7 Central to complexity science is the
problem of local fragility that results from the tradeoffs inherent in system design
decisions aimed at enhancing global system robustness.8 In their recent technical
article on this problem, systems engineers David L. Alderson and John C. Doyle
develop a sophisticated model for describing and probing what they call the “robust
yet fragile” (RYF) dilemma, showing that it is an inherent quality of any complex
adaptive system and explaining how it poses difficult system design issues.9 They
sum up the dilemma succinctly:
Historically, we have done a poor job in managing the fragilities
created by our complex networks, from global warming to ecosystem
destruction, global financial crises, etc. In many cases, past failures are
due to fragilities that were direct side effects of mechanisms that
promised to provide great benefits, including robustness. . . . [For
example,] [w]e are much better at designing, mass-producing, and
deploying network-enabled devices than we are at being able to predict
or control their collective behavior once deployed in the real world. The
result is that, when things fail, they often do so cryptically and
catastrophically.10
Understanding how the RYF dilemma plagues legal systems is important to the
extent law is expected to assist in managing systemic risk—the risk of very large
local or even system-wide failures—in other social systems.11 Not all risk is

6. MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 13 (2009) (emphasis omitted).
The term “complex adaptive system” is often used to distinguish between complex systems
that that are highly adaptive (such as an ecosystem) versus nonadaptive (such as a
hurricane). Id.
7. For an overview of complexity science and how the social sciences, including law,
have integrated it, see generally J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 885 (2008). Further details on complexity in the legal system are provided infra Part I.
8. See JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 9–10, 27–31, 139–40 (2007).
9. See Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, passim. Reference to “design” in complex
adaptive systems models “in no way implies a designer but merely some process, such as
Darwinian evolution.” Id. at 841. Of course, humans are (or try to be) the conscious
designers of social systems.
10. Id. at 839.
11. The concept of systemic risk has gained prominence in legal scholarship primarily
in connection with regulation of financial systems, for which it is widely asserted that
“regulation has an important role to play in managing systemic risk.” Iman Anabtawi &
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systemic, and not all system failures are the result of systemic risk. Rather,
“systemic risk is the risk of having not just statistically independent failures, but
interdependent, so-called ‘cascading’ failures in a network of N interconnected
system components. That is, systemic risks result from connections between risks
(‘networked risks’).”12 It is the potential for cascading that is so problematic where
systemic risk is high, as even “a localized initial failure . . . could have disastrous
effects and cause, in principle, unbounded damage as N goes to infinity.”13 The
legal system, as a complex adaptive system, is susceptible to its own systemic risks,
yet too often this is overlooked when exploring how law can manage systemic risks
elsewhere. If we cannot effectively manage systemic risk within the legal system,
how can we depend on the legal system to manage other systemic risks?
This Article builds on the Alderson-Doyle RYF dilemma model to help inform
how system design can contribute to managing systemic risk in legal systems.14 But
before explaining what I hope to accomplish with their model, a few words are
necessary about what I do not set out to establish. First, although I use two recent
catastrophes—the financial crisis and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill—to motivate
examination of systemic risk in the legal system, I am not suggesting that social
and economic catastrophes are always indicia of legal system failure, or that legal
system failure necessarily leads to social and economic catastrophes. It may be, for
example, that the offshore drilling regulatory system was actually quite robust and
prevented numerous other potential catastrophic spills we don’t know about
because they didn’t happen.15 And it may be that the legal system is failing
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1352 (2011). See generally infra Part IV.B. This Article
advances a theory of systemic risk that is broader in scope and intended to be applicable to
social and economic systems besides the financial system, including the legal system.
12. Dirk Helbing, Globally Networked Risks and How to Respond, 497 NATURE 51, 51
box 1 (2013). Helbing’s article provides a sweeping, and positively scary, account of
systemic risk in social systems.
13. Id.
14. Although a number of legal scholars including myself have begun to incorporate
complexity science into legal theory, see Ruhl, supra note 7, at 909–10 (collecting
references), the RYF dilemma has not received formal theoretical development. Also, the
concept of “robustness,” which is central to the RYF dilemma theory and used widely in
complexity science, is similar to the concept of “resilience” used widely in social-ecological
systems theory. Cf. William A. Brock, Karl-Göran Mäle & Charles Perrings, Resilience and
Sustainability: The Economic Analysis of Nonlinear Dynamic Systems, in PANARCHY, 270–
75 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002); C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson &
Donald Ludwig, in PANARCHY, supra, at 3, 15–18; Marten Scheffer, Frances Westley,
William A. Brock & Milena Holmgren, Dynamic Interaction of Societies and Ecosystems—
Linking Theories from Ecology, Economy, and Sociology, in PANARCHY, supra, at 195, 202–
03. A number of legal scholars including myself have begun to incorporate resilience theory
into legal theory, but again not in ways that capture the RYF dilemma model. See, e.g., J.B.
Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—
With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373 (2011). Because I
find the RYF dilemma model particularly useful for thinking about how complexity science
and resilience theory inform legal system design, especially in getting at the problem of
managing systemic risk, I believe it merits separate and focused examination.
15. See Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Oversight in Hindsight: Assessing the
U.S. Regulatory System in the Wake of Calamity, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN, supra note
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miserably without any social or economic catastrophes as markers. Rather,
catastrophes tend to focus people and policymakers on finding causes and
solutions, with eyes often turning in both respects toward the legal system. I share
the concern of others that this often politically motivated, after-the-fact rush to
“never let that happen again” may overstate the case that legal system failure is a
causal agent and thus lead to maladaptive legal reform responses.16 On the other
hand, catastrophes are at least prima facie evidence that laws intended to regulate a
particular problem don’t always succeed, making legal system failure a candidate
for causal analysis. Of course, many factors operating on and within the legal
system can lead to its failure, including factors having little to do with system
design, such as inadequate funding, political pressure, and the personal motivations
of legal actors. My thesis, however, is that even with no other such causal force in
play, the architecture of legal systems necessarily embeds some degree of systemic
risk in the system’s behavior, and that the architectural design matters as to how
much.
Of the many goals and criteria for legal system design, therefore, the only one I
care about here is managing for the degree of systemic risk within the legal system.
I acknowledge that society might decide that other goals and criteria take priority,
and that tradeoffs likely exist between designing for them and designing for
systemic risk. I also acknowledge that even when made the top priority,
purposively managing for systemic risk in the legal system will not eliminate
failures in the legal system or other social systems. But I hope to show that not
purposively managing for systemic risk carries a potentially huge cost. Hence,
recognizing that I am wearing blinders, my sole purpose in this Article is to bear
down on the challenge of managing systemic risk in legal systems.
With that scope in mind, Part I defines complexity in the context of the
institutions and instruments that make up the legal system. Part II defines the five
dimensions of robustness that support functionality of the legal system:
(1) reliability, (2) efficiency, (3) scalability, (4) modularity, and (5) evolvability.
Part III then defines fragility, examining the design constraints that impede system
robustness and the fail-safe system-control strategies for reducing their effects.
Constraints exist at component, system, and protocol levels of a system, and those
three forces also combine to produce emergent system-wide constraints as well.
Regulating these effects is difficult. The predominant fail-safe strategies rely
primarily on using ultraquality system components, redundancy in system
operations, and sensors to detect undesirable conditions, with feedback mechanisms
to alert system operation actuators to anticipated consequences.
Using the RYF dilemma model developed in Parts I through III, Part IV defines
systemic risk, showing how the drive to overcome robustness constraints through
fail-safe strategies adds inexorably to system organization, complexity, and risk of
failure. As system architecture depends more and more on the interdependent
components and system protocols needed to support fail-safe strategies, any local
failure could cascade through the system to reach catastrophic proportions. Over
time, as each local failure is met with new fail-safe strategies, system architecture

2, at 1, 13 (“We see the disasters that were not prevented; we seldom see evidence of the
disasters that were successfully prevented . . . .”).
16. See id. at 1–9.
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grows more complex, and systemic risk becomes embedded in the system.
Paradoxically, therefore, the very measures taken to respond to local failures can
add to the risk of catastrophic failures.
There is no way around the RYF dilemma—some degree of systemic risk is
inherent in any complex adaptive system—but the balance between robustness and
fragility is something we can hope to influence. To explore how, Part V applies the
RYF dilemma model to a concrete legal systemic risk management context—oil
drilling in the deep Gulf of Mexico. The legal regime governing oil exploration and
extraction in the deep Gulf regions has been blamed as contributing to the set of
failures that led to the Deepwater Horizon spill and is at the center of reform
initiatives. Using this case study, I argue that the RYF dilemma model provides
valuable insights into how legal systems fail and how to manage legal systemic
risk.
I. COMPLEXITY
Complexity science studies complex adaptive systems in all their glory, and
defining complexity is a broad and dense topic, the full scope of which is neither
possible nor necessary to explain here.17 What follows in this Part, therefore, is an
abbreviated foray into complexity science meant to establish two core concepts
essential to developing the RYF dilemma model and applying it to legal systems—
interconnected structure and emergent behavior.18
A. Interconnected Structure
First we must distinguish between complexity and complicatedness. My sense is
that saying the American legal system is complicated requires no proof here, but is
it complex? Complicatedness and complexity are not the same. The “very basic
question we must consider is how complex, versus complicated, are social
worlds.”19 The distinction goes to the essence of complexity science:
In a complicated world, the various elements that make up the system
maintain a degree of independence from one another. Thus, removing
one such element (which reduces the level of complication) does not
fundamentally alter the system’s behavior apart from that which
directly resulted from the piece that was removed. Complexity arises
when the dependencies among the elements become important. In such
a system, removing one such element destroys system behavior to an

17. For an extensive discussion of what complexity means, see MITCHELL, supra note 6,
at 94–111.
18. Some of what appears in this section is an extremely condensed version of material
found in Ruhl, supra note 7.
19. MILLER & PAGE, supra note 8, at 27.
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extent that goes well beyond what is embodied by the particular
element that is removed.20
No experienced lawyer could fail to appreciate the difference between
complicated and complex, as so defined, in our legal system.21 For example, a
statute might specify that an agency may consider any or all factors from a long,
intricate list when making a certain decision to protect public health. That might
make for a complicated decision process. But we could pluck out one of the factors
and make the process less complicated without making it less (or more) complex—
the factor may be independent from the other factors and simply allow the agency
to make another discrete analysis. But if the statute specifies that the agency must
consider all the factors and balance them to most effectively protect public health,
the factors no longer are independent, and plucking out one of them could
significantly alter the analysis. And this is merely a simple example. Statutes that
cross-reference provisions internally and from other statutes, or assign
responsibilities to multiple agencies, ramp up the interconnectedness of the
system,22 and the judiciary’s hierarchical structure and practice of stare decisis
fundamentally link courts with courts and opinions with opinions in ways that
produce complicated and complex (as defined herein) institutional and instrumental
connections.23
Complexity science studies these structural interagent dependencies and the
system-wide effects they produce.24 While there is no universally agreed upon

20. Id. at 9. Thus “work is needed on distinguishing the complex . . . from the just
complicated in the presence of many possible explanatory models and imperfect data.”
Nicholas W. Watkins & Mervyn P. Freeman, Natural Complexity, 320 SCIENCE 323, 324
(2008).
21. I stress here that I am using a specified definition of complexity not only to
differentiate mere complicatedness but also to define complex adaptive systems. Complexity
could also be defined in practical terms. For example, Peter Schuck “define[s] a legal system
as complex to the extent that its rules, processes, institutions, and supporting culture possess
four features: density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy or uncertainty.” Peter
H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 3
(1992). Louis Kaplow defined complexity of legal rules as “the number and difficulty of
distinctions the rules make.” Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal
Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 150 (1995). I am not suggesting these or other definitions
of legal complexity are wrong or incomplete, only that this is not how complexity science
defines complexity.
22. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 796–806 (2003)
(exploring the difference between complicated and complex sets of legal rules).
23. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV.
1, 11–24 (2011).
24. In ecology, for example, “[t]he importance of ecosystem complexity and the vast
array of interconnections that underlie ecosystem function is certainly one of the most
important lessons of 10 decades of ecological research and natural resource management
experience.” NORMAN L. CHRISTENSEN, ANN M. BARTUSKA, JAMES H. BROWN, STEPHEN
CARPENTER, CARLA D’ANTONIO, ROBERT FRANCIS, JERRY F. FRANKLIN, JAMES A.
MACMAHON, REED F. NOSS, DAVID J. PARSONS, CHARLES H. PETERSON, MONICA G. TURNER
& ROBERT WOODMANSEE, THE REPORT OF THE ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA
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metric for measuring complexity in such a system,25 the theoretical model has come
to rest on a collection of agent and system properties that are at the core of
complexity.26 Alderson and Doyle contend that the key to such properties for
purposes of the RYF dilemma model are “large and/or diverse number of
components, the complexity of their interconnections and interactions, and the
complexity of the behaviors that result.”27 This framework is easy for anyone with
any training in law to map onto the legal system, and I do so here only to set up the
context for probing the RYF dilemma model.
At any given time, the components of the legal system consist of a broad
diversity of institutions—the organizations of people who make, interpret, and
enforce laws and instruments—and the laws, regulations, cases, and related legal
content the institutions produce.28 For my purposes, we can put aside the question
of what institutions and instruments are in or out of the legal system; what is
important for now is that there is a collection of such components we call the legal
system. These components are interconnected and interactive. The institutions are
interconnected through structures such as hierarchies of courts and legislative
creation and oversight of agencies, and they interact in forums such as judicial
trials, legislative hearings and debates, and agency rulemakings. The instruments
also are interconnected through mechanisms such as code structures and interact
through cross-references and other devices. When we turn the system on, it
behaves—the network of institutions and the maze of instruments get to work. An
agency adopts a rule, which prompts another agency to enforce a different rule,
which leads to litigation before a judge, who issues an opinion that is overruled by
a higher court, which prompts a legislature to enact a new statute, and so on. The
institutional agents follow procedural rules (e.g., notice and comment), and the
instrumental agents are embedded within rules for rules (e.g., canons of statutory
construction), but there is no central controller. There are hierarchies for various
institutions (e.g., courts) and instruments (e.g., federal law supremacy), but there is
no master agent controlling the system.
B. Emergent Behavior
The legal system’s structure thus appears to be complex, but how do we know if
the system’s behavior is complex? The system property most important for my
(and most) purposes in this sense is emergence. The core idea of the emergence
COMMITTEE ON THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, reprinted in 6
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 669 (1996).
25. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 8, app. at 233–36; Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1,
at 840.
26. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 8, at 19–20. For a review of these and other
complex adaptive systems properties in the context of legal systems, see generally Ruhl,
supra note 7, at 892–901.
27. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 840.
28. There are, of course, many different ways and terms used to describe the legal
system, but for my purposes what matters are the components. It is quite common for legal
scholars to speak of legal institutions and instruments in the way I use the terms to describe
and discuss the legal system. Westlaw searches for the terms in the “Law Reviews &
Journals” library turn up thousands of documents.
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property is that the system exhibits macroscopic behavior that could not be
predicted by examining the system components, interconnections, and interactions
at microscopic scales.29 In more technical terms, emergence has been defined as
“complicated global patterns emerging from local or individual interaction rules
between parts of a system.”30 To put it in practical examples, “[t]hat a government
is democratic or that a diamond is hard are properties defined at the level of the
government or the diamond. They are not properties of the components of a
government or a diamond.”31 Because emergent system behaviors are the
macroscale product of many such local interaction rules, it is not possible to predict
emergent behavior simply by describing the interaction rules. Emergence thus is “a
process that leads to the appearance of structure not directly described by the
defining constraints and instantaneous forces that control a system.”32
Emergence permeates legal systems. For example, “many have observed[] [that]
the common law is a complex adaptive system in which an array of agents,
institutions, and social contexts together act to produce its substantive
jurisprudence.”33 That “substantive jurisprudence” emerges from the common law
system through a process of gradual development and evolution of doctrine based
on bedrock principles set down centuries ago. Although one must read the cases to
know the common law of, say, property, the common law of property is something
more than just the sum of the cases. The Restatement of Property, for example, is
more than a case reporter—it is the product of tremendous effort by property law
experts over time to synthesize case law into macroscale doctrinal themes and
structures as well as specific principles. Indeed, the very process of legal research
and argumentation, in common law or statutory fields, is at bottom a searching for
emergent principles from the mass of relevant statutes, regulations, and cases. In
short, the cliché that in law school one learns to “think like a lawyer” captures a
very real feature of the legal system—that one cannot easily navigate it without an
appreciation that it is, indeed, a system.
Emergent legal system behavior, while a product of the legal system’s structural
interconnectedness, cannot be predicted from a reductionist study of the
interconnected components. For example, legal concepts and principles—the

29. MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 12–13.
30. P.-M. Binder, Frustration in Complexity, 320 SCIENCE 322, 322 (2008).
31. Russ Abbott, Putting Complex Systems to Work, COMPLEXITY, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at
30, 33.
32. James P. Crutchfield, Is Anything Ever New? Considering Emergence, in
COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALITY 515, 516 (George A. Cowan, David Pines
& David Meltzer eds., 1994). For a broad study of emergence in social and natural systems,
see generally STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS,
CITIES, AND SOFTWARE (2001); Peter A. Corning, The Re-emergence of “Emergence”: A
Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory, COMPLEXITY, July–Aug. 2002, at 18. For a history
of the concept of emergence from its early development in general systems theory to its use
in complexity science, see generally R. KEITH SAWYER, SOCIAL EMERGENCE: SOCIETIES AS
COMPLEX SYSTEMS 10–45 (2005).
33. Daniel Martin Katz, Joshua R. Gubler, Jon Zelner, Michael J. Bommarito II, Eric
Provins & Eitan Ingall, Reproduction of Hierarchy? A Social Network Analysis of the
American Law Professoriate, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76, 97 (2011) (footnote omitted).
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instrumental agents in the legal system—can be broken down into finely grained
components, as in the way legal research services such as Westlaw and Lexis have
developed their KeyCite and Headnotes cataloguing systems. These cataloguing
systems produce hierarchical concept frameworks by placing broad legal concepts
such as constitutional law and environmental law at the top and then drill down
from those broad concepts through successive levels of increasingly narrow
subtopics. Bommarito’s study of opinion headnotes in over 23,000 Supreme Court
cases illustrates the branching form of what this hierarchy looks like when laid out
graphically.34 As any lawyer knows, however, cases often are about more than one
narrow sub-sub-subtopic. Rather, a particular judicial opinion could involve a
combination of numerous broad and narrow concepts from various parts of this
hierarchical framework. As Bommarito’s study vividly demonstrates, when
mapped over masses of opinions and long time frames, these combinations exhibit
patterns of concept relationships that are not inherently obvious from an
examination of the multitude of discrete components of the concept hierarchy.35 So,
how do these patterns form? How does the multitude of discrete legal concepts get
thrown together in thousands of cases over time in ways that exhibit strong
conceptual interconnections? The answer lies in the work of the multitude of
interconnected institutional agents in the legal system—the lawyers and judges—
working within the system’s structure to litigate and decide cases. Factual contexts,
litigation strategies, and judicial reasoning combine to bring together a web of legal
concepts particular to each case, but as Bommarito’s study shows, over time we
find the concept hierarchy as a whole to exhibit various strong and weak concept
interconnections.36 These revealed interconnection patterns are not explicitly built
into or otherwise obvious from the concept hierarchy itself, the purpose of which,
quite to the contrary, is about disaggregating legal concepts into finely grained
discrete concepts. Rather, they are macroscale emergent behavior of the legal
system.
The relationship between the organization of system component
interconnectedness and the emergence of macroscale system behavior is critical to
understanding the origins of the RYF dilemma. As a prelude to what follows in the
next two parts of the Article covering robustness and fragility, which complete the
model’s basic form, Alderson and Doyle drive this point home in succinct terms:
Emergence is . . . associated with unintended consequences for
either good (an emergent benefit) or bad (an emergent fragility).
Emergent benefits in organized systems are sufficiently rare as to be
peripheral to this paper, much wishful thinking notwithstanding . . . . In
contrast, emergent fragilities, whether unintended or the result of hard
tradeoffs, are dominant problems in complex systems.37

34. See Michael J. Bommarito II, Exploring Relationships Between Legal Concepts in
the United States Supreme Court 3 fig. 1 (Nov. 5, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1814169.
35. See id. at 6–16.
36. See id. at 4–9.
37. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 841 (emphasis omitted).
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II. ROBUSTNESS
In the technical language of complexity science, a system or any of its properties
is more robust the more invariant it is with respect to a set of shocks or
perturbations.38 Using this framework, a legal system could be described as robust
if it remains relatively intact endogenously, notwithstanding disruptions from
exogenous forces and endogenous failures. This is the meaning I will use,
recognizing that it carries no particular normative baggage—what most Americans
might consider a contemptible legal system could nonetheless be a robust one. In
other words, one could define robustness of the legal system as its capacity to meet
normative goals, but that is not the meaning I use.
That is not a trivial point. It is reasonable to assume that most citizens want their
legal system to fulfill a particular normative orientation and be robust, as it
wouldn’t be much of a legal system if it were normatively desirable yet subject to
collapse at any moment. To be sure, it may be the case that the measures necessary
to maximize robustness in a legal system have consequences some of which may be
normatively unsatisfactory.39 It may also be the case that our normative desires for
the other social systems limit our capacity to make the legal system robust.40 I will
return to these problems later; my aim in this Part is to explore what robustness of
legal systems means independent of normative goals for law and other social
systems.
In their deep examination of robustness in complex adaptive systems, Alderson
and Doyle explain that several features of a system contribute to robustness:
“Reliability involves robustness to component failures. Efficiency is robustness to
resource scarcity. Scalability is robustness to changes to the size and complexity of
the system as a whole. Modularity is robustness to structured component
rearrangements. Evolvability is robustness of lineages to changes on long time
scales.”41
Robustness thus captures more than stability, rigidity, or permanence, as it
anticipates system-level change and evolution. Stability to fluctuations in external
inputs may require changes in internal system parameters, which themselves are
forces of perturbation. At its core, therefore, “robustness is a measure of feature
persistence in systems where the perturbations . . . represent changes in system
composition, system topology, or in the fundamental assumptions regarding the
environment in which the system operates.”42 The core of the robustness concept,
therefore, is the “fitness of the ‘strategic options’ open to a system” for dealing
with such perturbations.43 While legal scholars do not use this precise terminology

38. See, e.g., id. at 840.
39. For example, most Americans likely would oppose severe restrictions on due
process even if shown to promote legal system robustness.
40. For example, Americans likely would oppose measures shown to promote legal
system robustness if they were also shown to promote severe economic decline for children
and the elderly.
41. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 840 (emphases in original).
42. Erica Jen, Stable or Robust? What’s the Difference?, COMPLEXITY, Jan.–Feb. 2003,
at 12, 13–14 (comparing stability and robustness).
43. Id. at 16.
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and typology, each of these concepts finds a rich tradition of analysis and debate in
legal scholarship.
A. Reliability
It makes intuitive sense that global reliability of the legal system—that it
successfully works the way intended—would be a valued design goal, and that
certain institutions and instruments are seen as pivotal in this respect. We might
conclude, for example, that “[c]ertain forms of regulation have been found to work,
while others have proved less reliable,”44 or that “[r]espect for and deference to
judicial precedent is what fortifies the integrity of our legal system; it is what
makes the system reliable.”45 In short, that the legal system should be reliable
seems an uncontroversial aspiration.
System component failures erode global system reliability, however, meaning a
robust system design must plan for component failure. The legal system is replete
with such design features. Institutional component failures are corrected through
mechanisms such as relief for ineffective counsel, judicial review of arbitrary
agency action, and appellate review for clear error of judgment, and instrument
failures are corrected through judicial review for statutes suffering from
constitutional infirmities and agency rules inconsistent with clear legislative
directives. By incorporating design features to detect and correct these and other
institutional and instrument component failures, overall system reliability is
enhanced.
B. Efficiency
Like most social systems, the legal system does not have the luxury of infinite
resources—it must make do with what it has available in terms of institutional
capacity. And the legal system can be quite expensive to operate,46 making design
for efficiency a practical necessity.
Designing for efficiency of the legal system is not the same question as how to
design a legal system to promote efficiency in other social systems, such as land
use or business transactions, a topic which has attracted considerable scholarly
debate and is usually what is meant when efficiency and legal systems are
discussed in the same breath.47 The two design questions are potentially related, but

44. Jeremy Waldron, “The Experience and Good Thinking Foreign Sources May
Convey”: Justice Ginsburg and the Use of Foreign Law, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1243, 1262
(2012).
45. Conor P. McEvily, Vested Interests: The Federal Felon Body-Armor Ban and the
Continuing Vitality of Scarborough v. United States, 100 GEO. L.J. 1341, 1398 (2012).
46. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the
Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 575 (1997) (exploring why
“[t]he legal system is a very costly social institution”).
47. See, e.g., Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus
Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 380–411 (2008)
(summarizing legal scholarship on efficiency-maximizing legal system designs and
comparing common law and civil law systems). In that application, efficiency is a normative
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quite distinct. For example, requiring decision makers to perform cost-benefit
analysis of their proposed decisions might promote efficiency of resource
allocations in other social systems if conducted thoroughly and reliably. Even when
it achieves that normative goal, however, cost-benefit analysis might be a costly
and potentially inefficient legal decision-making method, or it might promote
efficient decision making—either way, that’s different from its efficiency effect on
other social systems.
Efficiency of (as opposed to promoted by) the legal system is served by a broad
variety of design mechanisms. For example, the legal scholars have observed that
“standing requirements improve judicial decision-making, conserve judicial
resources, and reduce conflict between the judiciary and the political branches”48
and “[t]he main justification for plea bargaining is that it is necessary for the
continued function and efficiency of the criminal justice system.”49 As
controversial as standing rules, plea bargaining practices, and similar measures may
be, there is little doubt that by incorporating design features such as these, overall
legal system resources can be more efficiently conserved.
C. Scalability
Societies change in scale over time as the number of people, political units, and
other components grow or contract in number, so it will be useful if social systems
smoothly accommodate such scale changes and continue to deliver their
functionality. This should be no less a design ideal for legal institutions and
instruments than it is for, say, the economy. In other words, it would be odd for a
society to design a legal system that depends for its functionality on a static social
scale, tolerating little or no change in the number of people or size of jurisdiction.
Certainly the American legal system has been scalable in this respect,
accommodating growth since its inception by hundreds of millions of people,
hundreds of millions of acres, and thousands of political units on multiple
jurisdictional scales. As Justice Breyer recently pointed out,
[T]he Federal government at the time of the founding consisted of
about 2,000 employees and served a population of about 4 million.
Today, however, the Federal Government employs about 4.4 million
workers who serve a Nation of more than 310 million people living in a
society characterized by rapid technological, economic, and social
change.50

goal for other social systems that the legal system is to support, whereas robustness of the
legal system depends on efficient operation of legal institutions and instruments given the
legal system’s resource limitations.
48. Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 727, 728
(2009).
49. Tina Wan, Note, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional
Conditions Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC.
JUST. 33, 39 (2007).
50. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3168
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
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As people expanded into new territory, new states were formed that largely
replicated judicial and legislative systems from other states, and doctrines such
as Equal Footing allowed them to be absorbed into the existing federal legal
system rather seamlessly. 51 Through this process, the legal system has steadily
added more legislatures, courts, agencies, lawyers, and laws along the way,52
and its scope of regulation has steadily expanded as its context expanded, now
encompassing topics once unimaginable, such as nuclear power, airline safety,
and the Internet.53 Yet our legal system has retained its basic constitutive
system and structure, albeit with some significant strains that could be
attributed principally to growth in population or geography.54
D. Modularity
Many complex adaptive systems are modular, in that they are composed of
small, densely connected, often overlapping groups of components.55
Modularity promotes system robustness by allowing systems to work in parallel
and to reconfigure, either in response to a component failure or as an adaptive
move, without crashing the system. Indeed, although there is tremendous
debate over which is the best configuration for given policy problems, it is
widely agreed that the American legal system’s federalism structure allows an
institutional modularity, with approaches ranging from federal preemption to
cooperative federalism, which can switch out and combine different scales and
configurations of governance to respond to policy problems.56 Legal

51. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
52. Some claim it has grown too much in proportion to growth of other social systems,
more on which infra Part IV.A. See Shavell, supra note 46, at 575–76 (discussing views that
growth of the legal system has been excessive).
53. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3168 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. Consider, for example, the difficulty the nation and legal system experienced when
adding new states to a union divided over the legal institution of slavery. See Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
55. See James P. Bagrow, Sune Lehmann & Yong-Yeol Ahn, Robustness and Modular
Structure in Networks 1–2 (Feb. 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1102.5085v1.pdf.
56. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE
L.J. 795, 805–37, 876–96 (2005) (discussing modular governance approaches). “Centralized
federalism suggests that the federal government should address environmental problems on its
own. Devolved federalism argues that environmental decisions are best made at the state and
local level. Dual federalism posits that each level of government should have distinct and
separate approaches to environmental regulation.” Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both
Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and
Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 405 (2008). “[C]ooperative federalism is a system
of shared authority between the federal and state governments” in which “state programs adopt
environmental standards at least as stringent as the federal program. . . . [and] the federal
government retains oversight authority.” David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive
Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1796, 1811–12 (2008).
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instruments also can be designed to provide modular flexibility, as in the
famous metaphor of property as a bundle of sticks.57
E. Evolvability
A robust complex adaptive system is not unchanging; rather, it incorporates
change. For example, the “dynamic equilibrium” model now firmly in place in
fields such as ecology is based on the assumption that change in natural systems is
inherent even if it is bounded within predictable confines.58 Thus, “any system that
is expected to survive over the long term must have evolvability as a primary
design consideration.”59 Systems that cannot change tend to die.
Robust legal systems must evolve as well,60 and legal scholars have for centuries
devoted attention to assessing how and why they do.61 The American legal system
has unquestionably proven evolvable over time, capable of responding to changing
context by changing itself. Indeed, the common law is practically designed to
promote evolution. Consider, for example, that it is well accepted under the
common law of nuisance that “changed circumstances or new knowledge may
make what was previously permissible no longer so.”62 Examples of such changes
are numerous. At one time, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that “[i]f there is any
fact which may be supposed to be known by everybody, and, therefore, by courts, it
is that swamps and stagnant waters are the cause of malarial and malignant fevers,
and that the police power is never more legitimately exercised than in removing
such nuisances.”63 Perhaps that made sense then. Today, by contrast, it would be
unheard of for a court to condemn a wetland area as a nuisance; indeed, some
courts now consider the draining or filling of a wetland to constitute a nuisance.64

57. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1783 (2007) (“Property is the area of law concerned with
those rights most based on exclusion. In our terms, this means that property law tends to
define rights based on informational variables that bunch attributes and uses together and to
treat them as a modular component of the legal system.”).
58. See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994) (“Among the new paradigms in
ecology, none is more revolutionary than the idea that nature is not delicately balanced in
equilibrium, but rather is dynamic, often unpredictable, and perhaps even chaotic.”); see also
Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and Creativity: The New Ecology and Some Old
Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49 (1996); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the
New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 325–29
(1995) (book review) (discussing the emergence of “new ecology” in science and law).
59. Abbott, supra note 31, at 42.
60. Robert Howse, Moving the WTO Forward—One Case at a Time, 42 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 223, 223 (2009) (“[A]ny legal system, if it is going to be effective, has to be able to
evolve incrementally through practice.”).
61. For a survey of theories of legal evolution, see generally J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of
Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its
Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996).
62. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
63. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900).
64. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88–0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. July
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The common law of nuisance has responded to the modern science of wetland
ecology and changed public perceptions to make a complete 180-degree turn on the
status of wetlands,65 but by no means would anyone consider the common law of
nuisance to have been restructured as a system.66
III. FRAGILITY
Envision a team of legal experts designing a legal system from the ground up
with the aim of maximizing system robustness around the five attributes outlined
above in Part II. It doesn’t take much thought to anticipate that they would soon run
into design tradeoffs if they worked to maximize all dimensions of system
robustness at once. Investment to maximize efficiency, for example, may conflict
with investment to maximize component reliability.67
Tradeoffs like these permeate the legal system. Consider what might happen if
we were to increase the Constitution’s evolvability by substantially lowering
Article V barriers to amendments.68 Without suggesting what the differences would
be in the Constitution, it seems obvious there would be some, and that they would
have an impact on other robustness features of the legal system.69 One can easily
5, 2005) (finding a development that would fill a wetland a public nuisance based on
“evidence as to various effects that the development will have including increasing nitrogen
levels in the pond, both by reason of the nitrogen produced by the attendant residential septic
systems, and the reduced marsh area which actually filters and cleans runoff”).
65. For reviews of this doctrinal shift, see generally Michael C. Blumm & J.B. Ruhl,
Background Principles, Takings, and Libertarian Property: A Reply to Professor Huffman,
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 805, 819–30 (2010), and John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to
Wetlands Regulation to Ecological Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 787, 789–96 (2008).
66. As environmental law scholar William Rodgers has suggested, “A striking aspect of
nuisance law is its stasis (long term stability), recorded in familiar modes of judicial
expression, common analytical techniques, and custom-bred indicators of decision. . . . The
key to nuisance law, one might suppose, is found in the empirical lessons of its application
recorded over time, less so in the articulated rules of decision.” WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 113–14 (2d ed. 1994).
67. See Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 840 (using the example of efficiency and
reliability as possible system tradeoffs). Tradeoffs such as this are known more generally in
complexity science as conflicting constraints. See Ruhl, supra note 7, at 902.
68. See U.S. CONST. art. V. For discussions of the Article V amending procedures as an
obstacle to new amendments, see generally RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); JOHN R. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 1–13 (1994); Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C.
Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional
Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1993); Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983);
Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and
Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971 (1994).
69. There have been over ten thousand proposed amendments to the Constitution, very
few of which have made it through the gantlet of Article V. See JOHN R. VILE,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING
ISSUES, 1789–1995, at ix–xi, 363–80 (1996) (collating proposals by year). The amendment
process thus obviously matters to the constitutional construct of a legal system. For a survey
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imagine similar tradeoffs: having fewer judges could promote efficiency but reduce
reliability, pervasive federal preemption of state law could promote reliability but
reduce modularity, creating a new agency could increase modularity but decrease
efficiency, and so on. Understanding these tradeoffs and the constraints on system
functionality they produce lies at the heart of the design challenge for robustness of
legal systems.70
Of course, a truly great legal mind might devise fail-safe strategies for working
around this kind of conflict, but inevitably more constraints will arise as work
continues on the system design. Designing a robust legal system thus is largely an
exercise in identifying constraints on system functionality and then building
fail-safe strategies into the system control architecture to minimize fragilities
stemming from those constraints.71
A. Constraints on Robustness
Alderson and Doyle identify four kinds of constraints on system functionality:
(1) component-level, (2) system-level, (3) protocols, and (4) emergent constraints.
As with their dimensions of robustness, their constraints typology also maps
remarkably well onto the legal system and legal scholars’ concerns about the
inherent limits of its performance.
1. Component-Level Constraints
The first and most obvious constraint on robustness is that “[t]he components
that comprise any system are typically constrained in terms of what they can do,
even separately.”72 For example, legal scholars have pointed to the cognitive
capacities and biases of judges as constraining their decision-making reliability73
and have analyzed various conditions that constrain the effectiveness of
administrative agencies, such as so-called agency capture.74 People have their
of procedures for amending various state and national constitutions, see generally Elai Katz,
On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment,
29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251 (1996).
70. See Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation,
85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 742–47 (1987) (arguing that the American legal system may sacrifice
efficiency in order to attain other goals such as superior accuracy).
71. See Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 840 (stressing that these constraints arise
“largely independent of the process by which this organization arises, whether by design or
evolution”).
72. Id.
73. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 1, 1–20 (1994).
74. Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation
Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 381, 390 (2002) (“This undue control and domination of federal administrative agencies,
particularly by identifiable private parties that are subject to the regulatory authority of the
agency, has been defined as agency or industry ‘capture,’ and has, of course, been all but
universally seen as a negative consequence. Indeed, it is referred to as a ‘pathology’ in
administrative governance, and consequently, a phenomenon to be either avoided or
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limits, therefore legal institutions made up of people have their limits, and therefore
the legal instruments the institutions produce have their limits.
2. System-Level Constraints
Just as there are constraints inherent in each component in a system, “there are
complex constraints on the system as a whole that are not consequences of those on
the components.”75 These include functional requirements defining what the system
needs to accomplish and environmental and operating requirements defining the
conditions under which the system is working to achieve its functions.76
Here is where for the legal system we return to the question of norms. Legal
systems are built to accomplish many functions, some of which are intended to
fulfill certain internal norms, such as transparency or due process in legal decisions,
and to promote certain norms in other social systems, such as financial system
stability and environmental protection. Whatever these norms are is not important
to my project—pick any set you choose. The point is that these norms act as
functional requirement constraints on the system. If society demands that legal
institutions be transparent in their decision making, striving to meet that norm
could constrain their efficiency or reliability. If society demands that legal
instruments promote public health protection, striving to meet that norm could
place demands on legal institutions that limit their options.
Society might also place environmental constraints on the legal system, such as
through limited budgets, political barriers to judicial appointments, and similar
conditions that define what the system has to work with to fulfill its functions.
Other social systems, such as education, health care, or defense, also can constrain
the legal system by competing for resources or putting demands on legal
institutions, such as increased litigation. Some of these constraints may reflect
normative tradeoffs society has had to make, such as prioritizing scarce resources
for different systems, or the simple reality that normative goals for one social
system sometimes conflict with normative goals for another social system. When a
nation is at war or in emergency times, for example, social priorities may change
and demand that the legal system conform to new system-level constraints.77
3. Protocols
Protocols are “rules for the configuration and/or interaction of system
components” and as such may, but will not necessarily, impose additional
constraints on the overall system.78 Some rules will limit the number of possible
system solutions, but others may facilitate ways the system searches for robust
solutions.
As any new law student quickly learns, the legal system has produced a dizzying
plethora of rules for how it is supposed to operate, collectively known as legal
remedied.” (footnote omitted)).
75. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 841.
76. See id.
77. Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1669,
1669–71 (2010).
78. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 841.

578

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:559

process or procedure. Indeed, it does not go too far to suggest that in the legal
system, “procedure is power.”79 Constitutional due process constrains the legal
system,80 cost-benefit analysis is a protocol imposed on many agencies,81 and other
vast rules of criminal, civil, and administrative procedure abound at all scales of
governance. At the same time, these protocols facilitate the system’s functionality,
however, they also can constrain—the rules must be followed, and following them
limits options.82
4. Emergent Constraints
Component-level, system-level, and protocol-based constraints can interact to
produce emergent constraints that would not exist or be identified absent those
interactions.83 Indeed, “emergent fragilities, whether unintended or the result of
hard tradeoffs, are dominant problems in complex systems.”84
Hard policy tradeoffs are ubiquitous in the legal system and can constrain legal
institutions,85 but more subtle and yet more pernicious are the unintended and
largely unseen emergent constraints. For example, Jim Salzman and I have
explored what we call “system burdens” resulting from the accretion of many legal
instruments, all of which could be perfectly reasonable and efficient taken
individually, but which collectively could produce perverse effects including
inability of regulated entities to fully comply with the entire set of rules.86
Component-level, system-level, and protocol-based constraints on the legal system
could also generate similar emergent constraints operating on the legal system itself
rather than on other social systems. For example, legal scholars have pointed to the
unintended consequence of agency “ossification” as the product of agencies having
to navigate a maze of complex administrative procedure, statutory mandates, and
judicial review.87 All of those system protocols serve salutary purposes—they are

79. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1442 (2008).
80. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975,
975–86 (2009).
81. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 61 (2001) (“[L]egislative and administrative
decisions are supposed to represent good social policy because they follow some pragmatic
decision-making protocol, like cost-benefit analysis . . . .”).
82. See Burbank, supra note 79, passim (evaluating the impact of changes to federal
class action procedure and jurisdiction).
83. See Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 841.
84. Id.
85. Andrei Mamolea, The Future of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute: A Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 145 n.269 (2011) (“[P]olicy
tradeoffs are inherent in all judicial decisions.”).
86. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 22.
87. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals
Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393 (2000); Thomas O. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Mark
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial
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intended to promote legal system robustness—but their combined unintended
emergent effect can be to stultify agency decision making.
B. Fail-Safe Strategies
The set of constraints described in the previous section does not aggregate to
produce some sort of composite metaconstraint with uniform effect throughout the
system. Rather, their effects are such that a “system can have a property that is
robust to one set of perturbations and yet fragile for a different property and/or
perturbation,”88 and hence “understanding RYF tradeoffs lies at the heart of the
design challenges for network-centric infrastructures.”89 So what do we do?
Alderson and Doyle suggest a number of “design strategies for robustness”90—
what I call fail-safe strategies—for plugging the holes opened by system RYF
tradeoffs.
1. Ultraquality Components
One obvious approach for managing component-level constraints on system
robustness is to improve the quality of the system components so they rarely fail.
Design for such ultraquality components would strive to improve repeat
performance over time with acceptable costs of component production and
operation.91
Ultraquality design in legal systems, for example, could focus on people through
measures intended (at least ostensibly) to ensure quality, such as educational
requirements, bar exams, continuing legal education, and qualifications for judges
and administrators.92 Institutional decision quality can also be managed through
protocols such as cost-benefit analysis, data quality requirements, and peer
review.93 To be sure, some of these measures don’t produce enhanced quality, and
some could be pretexts for other motives, but the point is clear enough—quality
control is a viable fail-safe strategy within the legal system.
2. Redundancy
Achieving ultraquality widely throughout the components of a system has its
own set of constraints, such as cost and technology, and may simply not be possible
to achieve at levels that significantly enhance system robustness if other forms of
system constraints are substantial in effect. Provision for backups and other forms
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997).
88. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 840 (emphasis omitted) (internal brackets
omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 841–42.
91. See id. at 841.
92. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 151–56 (1989).
93. See Alexander Nathan Hecht, Administrative Process in an Information Age: The
Transformation of Agency Action Under the Data Quality Act, 31 J. LEGIS. 233, 233–35
(2005); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH U. L.
REV. 1, 1–35 (2006).
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of redundancy in components and system subparts, although not always
contributing to efficiency, thus is a well-studied and common strategy in systems
application.94
Redundancy of components at a variety of scales is common in legal systems.
Provisions for citizen suits, for example, allow citizens to step in as private
attorney-general functionaries where public enforcement is inadequate.95
Throughout the legal system mechanisms are provided for seeking second opinions,
such as judicial review, bicameralism, and separation of powers.96 Federalism in
general is seen by many legal scholars, particularly those advocating dynamic
federalism theory, as accommodating institutional redundancy to promote national
policy goals.97 While it may appear inefficient and cumbersome to have several
agencies at different scales working away on some mutual policy problem,98 the
built-in redundancy can provide significant benefits including broadened policy
99
space and promoting synergy between the scales and the formation of informal
100
networks among institutions.

94. See Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 841.
95. See Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and Judicial Interpretation: First
Time Tragedy, Second Time Farce, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 316–18 (1998); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185,
185–86 (2000); Miles A. Yanick, Note, Loss of Protection as Injury in Fact: An Approach to
Establishing Standing to Challenge Environmental Planning Decisions, 29 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 857, 874 (1996) (“Since the early days of the administrative state, citizen suits have
been valued for allowing private persons to help monitor the activities of government
agencies.”).
96. See Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions 3–6 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10–38, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1646414.
97. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 56, at 1796–1802; Robert B. Ahdieh, From
Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57
EMORY L.J. 1, 1–6 (2007); Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive
Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1, 1–10 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246–54 (2005). Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi
perceptively observe that the term “‘redundancy’ . . . compresses too much complexity” in
this multiagency delegation context and suggest instead the term “shared regulatory space.”
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1131, 1145 (2012). Although not employing a complexity science model, their
assessment of shared regulatory space examines many of the potential problems it poses for
effective regulatory action. See id. at 1134–54.
98. For a thoughtful survey of “the ongoing tension between the oft-voiced judicial and
scholarly preference for distinctly delineated federal and state roles and the reality of
overlapping federal and state roles that one finds [in] federalism’s central debates,” see
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1549–57 (2007).
99. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 56, at 1808–11.
100. See id. at 1809–10 (summarizing literature suggesting that overlapping authority can
promote initiative at one governance scale and spark other scales to follow promising policy
innovations).

2014]

MANAGING SYSTEMIC RISK

581

3. Sensors
Ultraquality and redundancy techniques “can be effective at providing
robustness in the face of component uncertainty, but they do not help to achieve
robustness to the external environment.”101 Another broad strategy for managing
constraints, therefore, is to design protocols that direct system components and
subsystems how to respond to changes in endogenous or exogenous conditions.
The first type of protocol necessary for implementing such a strategy consists of
rules for sensing changed conditions of potential concern. These “[s]ystem sensors
can monitor system performance; detect individual component wear, damage, or
failure; and/or identify external threats and perturbations to the system.”102 Indeed,
if not all components can achieve ultraquality reliability, priority might be given to
achieving ultraquality of sensor components, given their role in monitoring threats
to the system.103 Research on power grid networks has shown, for example, that
disabling even a small number of network failure sensors can render the grid
subject to new types of disturbances even when they remain robust to conventional
disturbances.104
Legal system sensors include mechanisms such as predecisional impact
assessments and monitoring, reporting, and disclosure requirements, all of which
fall under the theoretical domain of what is known as “reflexive law.”105 The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is an example of a legal system sensor
protocol for predecisional impact assessment. NEPA requires all federal agencies to
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official
on—(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, [and] (ii) any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented.106
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), responsible for issuing regulations
implementing NEPA’s mandated environmental impact statement (EIS) procedure
for federal agencies, requires agencies to consider the direct effects, indirect effects,

101. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 841.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 842.
104. See Yang Yang, Jianhui Wang & Adilson E. Motter, Network Observability
Transitions, PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS, Dec. 21, 2012, at 258701-1, 258701-4.
105. See David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social
Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 48–51 (1999) (explaining theory and development of
reflexive law); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995)
(developing and applying theory of reflexive law in environmental field); Richard B.
Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 127–51
(2001) (defining reflexive law and reviewing its instruments).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)–(ii) (2006). This provision also requires statements on
alternative actions, short- and long-term implications, and “any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources.” Id. § 4332(2)(C)(iii)–(v).
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and cumulative impacts of actions they carry out, fund, or authorize.107 The EIS
thus serves as a sensor mechanism requiring agencies to investigate and evaluate
impacts of their decisions. Similar predecision assessment measures apply in
agency rulemaking as well. For example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires
agencies to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for any rule that may have
important economic impact on a significant number of small businesses, and
similar predecision review measures abound in administrative law.108 Of course,
whether these kinds of sensors work, and whether they are efficient even if they do
work, are important design questions, more on which below; the point made here is
that our legal system has implanted many system sensors to evaluate itself
internally, to detect changes in its environment, and to measure its interactions with
other social systems.
4. Feedback to Actuators
The point of building sensor protocols into a system is to provide relevant
information about system failure potentials to system actuators—the components
and subsystems that would use information to initiate system responses. As
Alderson and Doyle summarize the function of these feedback protocols:
While the ability to maintain an appropriate level of situational
awareness of both components and environment is critical for complex
systems of all types, such visibility is of limited value if the system
cannot act upon that information, and taking appropriate action
typically drives complexity far more than does sensing. Using feedback
interconnection of sensors and actuators, it is possible to combine

107. The CEQ has defined direct effects as effects “which are caused by the action and
occur at the same time and place,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a) (2012), indirect effects as effects
“which are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are
still reasonably foreseeable,” id. § 1508.8(b), and cumulative impacts as
the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the
action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future
actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person
undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually
minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.
Id. § 1508.7.
108. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12 (2012). The law was amended by
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110
Stat. 857, 864–68. For thorough descriptions of this and related prepromulgation review
requirements, see generally Fred Anderson, Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, E. Donald Elliott,
Cynthia Farina, Ernest Gellhorn, John D. Graham, C. Boyden Gray, Jeffrey Holmstead,
Ronald M. Levin, Lars Noah, Katherine Rhyne & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Regulatory
Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 89 (2000); Daniel Cohen, S.981, The Regulatory Improvement
Act of 1998: The Most Recent Attempt to Develop a Solution in Search of a Problem, 50
ADMIN. L. REV. 699 (1998). For a discussion of how one agency in particular implements
these requirements, see generally Melissa Romine, Politics, the Environment, and
Regulatory Reform at the Environmental Protection Agency, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 1 (1999).

2014]

MANAGING SYSTEMIC RISK

583

components with very different properties to create systems with
robustness that far exceeds that of components separately.109
Mechanisms for feedback to actuators run throughout the legal system110 and
between the legal system and other social systems.111 NEPA, for example, does not
merely require the preparation of an EIS by the decision agency, but also requires
the decision agency to include the public and other federal, state, and local agencies
in the design and evaluation of the EIS and to respond to their input in the final
EIS.112 Indeed, perhaps more than any social system, the legal system shows how
“[f]eedback control can blend powerful but sloppy actuators with ultraquality
sensors to create systems that approach the power of the actuators and the
ultraquality of the sensors.”113
IV. SYSTEMIC RISK
With the basic components of complexity, robustness, and fragility defined, it is
time to put them together into a theory of system failure. How is it that a robust
complex adaptive system such as law, with all its fail-safe mechanisms guarding
against failure, nonetheless fails, usually locally but sometimes catastrophically?
Alderson and Doyle argue that, paradoxically, the causal source is the “complexity
in highly organized systems [that] arises primarily from design strategies intended
to create robustness.”114 Alderson and Doyle devote their work to supporting this
claim in their general model; in this Part, I do so in the focused context of legal
systems.

109. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 841–42.
110. See Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate
Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 485, 494 (2004) (“[T]he legitimacy of the system requires
that there be some method of feedback—whether formal or informal—through which
members of the political community can critique and change the dominant understandings of
the constitutional/legal system. In terms of the American constitutional system, with its
practice of judicial review, there must be formal or informal methods through which
protestant constitutional interpreters can shape, influence, and affect judicial interpretations
of the Constitution.”); Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law: Dynamic Regulation in a New
Institutional Economics Framework 4 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 13-17, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 (“Feedback
effects may occur both between outcomes and institutions and between different rulemakers.
Rules and rulemaking processes interact and evolve over time.”).
111. Susan Bandes, We Lost It at the Movies: The Rule of Law Goes from Washington to
Hollywood and Back Again, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 621, 623 (2007) (“[A] feedback loop
exists between law and popular culture . . . that . . . has consequences for the shape of the
legal system.”).
112. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2012).
113. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 842.
114. Id. at 840.
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A. Organization Breeds Complexity
One way of thinking of the legal system is as an enormous collection of fail-safe
strategies for managing system constraints. Law’s relations with other social
systems—and law’s internal set of rules—are designed to deliver higher quality
components, redundancy, sensors, and feedback to actuators. As a system among
the multitude of social systems, law’s aim is to regulate constraints and failures the
other social systems face: people killing people (criminal law), people dumping
waste in rivers (environmental law), people not living up to agreements (contract
law), people arguing over what constitutes income (tax law), and so on. Law, in
this sense, is a fail-safe strategy for other social systems. Yet the legal system has
layers of fail-safe strategies for its own internal constraints: appellate judges review
lower court decisions, rules of civil procedure direct lawyers how to act, several
agencies may have overlapping jurisdiction, and so on. Every feature in our modern
legal system is, at bottom, part of a fail-safe strategy for managing constraints on
the functionality of other social systems or of the legal system itself.
This collection of fail-safe strategies enhances legal system robustness, but it
also increases its complexity. The proliferation of components, sensors,
redundancies, feedback mechanisms, and actuator protocols between the legal
system and other systems, and within the legal system, connect components across
and within systems. As these design strategies are incorporated into the system
architecture, the system components become “arranged in a very specialized
structure that enables their functionality and/or robustness features.”115 The
organization of the system “is essentially the specialized structure that allows a
system to satisfy the aforementioned constraints.”116 But as more fail-safe strategies
are added, interconnectedness, and thus complexity, also increases.
This tradeoff between fail-safe-produced robustness and organized complexity
is evident in legal systems. For example, Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi offer a
probing analysis of the pros and cons of delegated agency redundancy in regulatory
systems.117 While lauded by some as a source of regulatory system robustness,118
Freeman and Rossi point out the barriers redundancy can present to effective
governance, many of which stem from coordination problems.119 Their solution,
however, is to employ yet another fail-safe strategy—feedback to actuators—as
they describe various ways to enhance interagency coordination within the
multiagency “shared regulatory space.”120 While their coordination facilitation
proposals may reduce the adverse effects of redundancy, the stepped-up feedback
structure of their vision of interagency coordination necessarily builds yet more
organized complexity in the relevant system of agencies. This is not to say their
proposals are not salutary, only that we must recognize that they carry with them
the baggage of added system organization and complexity.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 841.
See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 97.
See Adelman & Engel, supra note 56.
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 97, at 1135–55.
See id. at 1181–91.
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Indeed, Alderson and Doyle argue that “most of the complexity in highly
engineered or evolved systems is in control processes that regulate the internal state
and respond to external changes.”121 In other words, “complexity in highly
organized systems arises primarily from design strategies intended to create
robustness.”122 In short, system organization breeds system complexity.
After centuries of incorporating fail-safe strategies growing ever more diverse
and targeted, the American legal system is perhaps one of the most stunning
examples of organized complexity among all social systems. The full scope of its
organizational architecture—codes of statutes and regulations, court systems,
agency structures, common law doctrine—exceeds the grasp of any person, even
highly experienced lawyers. Political scientist and law professor Daniel Katz and
his colleagues have produced truly astounding case studies of law’s vast and nearly
impenetrable networks of organization.123 As one example of their body of work,
consider the abstract for A Mathematical Approach to the Study of the United States
Code:
The United States Code (Code) is a document containing over 22
million words that represents a large and important source of Federal
statutory law. Scholars and policy advocates often discuss the direction
and magnitude of changes in various aspects of the Code. However,
few have mathematically formalized the notions behind these
discussions or directly measured the resulting representations. This
paper addresses the current state of the literature in two ways. First, we
formalize a representation of the United States Code as the union of a
hierarchical network and a citation network over vertices containing the
language of the Code. This representation reflects the fact that the Code
is a hierarchically organized document containing language and explicit
citations between provisions. Second, we use this formalization to
measure aspects of the Code as codified in October 2008, November
2009, and March 2010. These measurements allow for a
characterization of the actual changes in the Code over time. Our
findings indicate that in the recent past, the Code has grown in its
amount of structure, interdependence, and language.124

121. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 842.
122. Id. at 840.
123. See Michael J. Bommarito II & Daniel M. Katz, A Mathematical Approach to the
Study of the United States Code, 389 PHYSICA A 4195 (2010); Michael J. Bommarito II,
Daniel Martin Katz, Jonathan L. Zelner & James H. Fowler, Distance Measures for Dynamic
Citation Networks, 389 PHYSICA A 4201 (2010); Michael J. Bommarito II, Daniel M. Katz &
Jonathen L. Zelner, On the Stability of Community Detection Algorithms on Longitudinal
Citation Data, 4 PROCEDIA SOCIAL & BEHAV. SCI. 26 (2010); Daniel M. Katz & Derek K.
Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis of the American Federal Judiciary, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 457 (2010); Michael J. Bommarito II, Daniel Katz & Jon Zelner, Law as a
Seamless Web? Comparison of Various Network Representations of the United States
Supreme Court Corpus (1791–2005) (June 3, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1419525.
124. Bommarito & Katz, supra note 123, at 4195.
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Playing off of this description of their and other network theorists’ work, any
lawyer could follow along in this thought experiment: Arrange each title of the U.S.
Code as nodes in a network. In layers starting below each node, add nodes for each
title’s major divisions, then again for the next subdivision, and so on down to the
final sub-sub-sub-etc.-sections, connecting nodes in each branch with red
connectors, so that you have constructed what looks like a hierarchy chart for each
Code title. Now put connectors between any node within a single branch that
cross-references a node in a different branch in that same Code title’s hierarchy,
and color all those connectors blue. Next put connectors between cross-referenced
nodes from different Code titles and color those green.125 Now repeat that same
representation of interconnectedness for the Code of Federal Regulations, and then
place connectors between the two networks to represent cross-references between
the statutes and regulations. Do this for the legislation and regulations of all fifty
states as well, and then add all the cross-jurisdictional references. Finally, turn the
system “on” so all nodes and connectors are followed in real time, flashing or
disappearing as they are activated through additional cross-references, new
enactments, amendments, repeals, and so on.
With enough terabytes, computer power, and data collection this coarse network
representation of law’s organization could be constructed, refined, and studied to
give us an eye into law’s complexity.126 My sense is that confident explanations for
what is going on in the system would be elusive. Of particular interest for my
purposes would be events such as rapid growth or decay in sectors of network
structure, long periods of illumination or darkness in sectors of the system, bursts
of illumination, and correlations between areas of activity or inertia in the system,
as well as between activity or inertia in other social systems. While all that would
be fascinating, however, the core question for my purposes is whether there is any
way of knowing whether particular network structures, growth and decay, darkness
and illumination, bursts of brightness, and other events tell us anything about the
system’s functionality and risk of failure. Katz’s work suggests the structure,
interdependence, and language of the legal system—its organized complexity—has
grown127 to what some have suggested are incomprehensible proportions.128 But
why if it is so impressively organized does it so frequently fail? Complexity science
provides insights.129

125. For a graphic representation of what this might look like, see id. at 4197 fig.1, and
Romain Boulet, Pierre Mazzega & Danièle Bourcier, Network Analysis of the French
Environmental Code, in AI APPROACHES TO THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 39, 43
fig.1 (Pompeu Casanovas et al. eds., 2010).
126. The tools of modern complex network science would allow for even more diverse
and granular metrics and analytic tools than I have described here. See generally MILLER &
PAGE, supra note 8.
127. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 22, at 770–75 (offering some metrics and statistics
on growth of rules in the legal system); Shavell, supra note 46, at 575–76 (discussing growth
in expenditures and number of lawyers).
128. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); Bayless
Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767 (1977).
129. The study of failure has become a popular topic. Several noteworthy treatments of
the subject, drawing in varying degrees from complexity science themes, include MARK
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B. Complexity Breeds Systemic Risk
When the legal system has not succeeded in avoiding a failure in another social
system or in the legal system itself, the call for new or reformed legal institutions
and instruments can be deafening. In other words, we design more fail-safe
strategies to patch up the problems the previous set did not adequately manage. As
remedial as this may be at the microscopic scale of the particular problem under
scrutiny, the macroscopic effects of applying this approach repeatedly should not
be ignored. When more fail-safe strategies are added to the system,
interconnectedness increases, which increases organization, which increases
complexity. Robustness to the problem may be enhanced; however, exposure to
failure also increases. In short, “[a]s systems become more complex, the number of
points of failure inevitably also increases, and even the most experienced and
intelligent individual cannot comprehend all possible failure scenarios with
proactive risk analysis.”130
There are several causal sources for this paradoxical effect. The first is what I
will call the novel perturbation problem. System robustness generally is designed
for known sources of perturbation. The particular system control organization that
develops over time to enhance robustness to the known problems, however
successful in that respect, may unwittingly be highly susceptible to failure from a
different, previously unknown (or at least unexpected) type of perturbation that just
happens to expose a fragility in the system architecture that was not relevant to the
previous set of perturbations.131 A levee system, for example, might be designed to
be highly effective against flooding, but if the area was not prone to earthquakes
the design might not take that risk into account. A freak earthquake thus could
expose the system to devastating failure.132
BUCHANAN, UBIQUITY: WHY CATASTROPHES HAPPEN (2000); DIETRICH DÖRNER, THE LOGIC
OF FAILURE (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1996) (1989); PAUL ORMEROD, WHY
MOST THINGS FAIL (2005); CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS (1984).
130. Eric Fielding, Andrew W. Lo & Jian Helen Yang, The National Transportation
Safety Board: A Model for Systemic Risk Management 34 (Nov. 14, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695781.
131. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 842.
132. For an expansive treatment of the “novel perturbation” problem ranging from
abstractions and musings to deep philosophical insights and formal mathematical ideas, see
generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE (2d ed. 2010). Although Taleb seems at times to claim discovery of the novel
perturbation problem, the idea has been at the core of complexity science since its inception,
see MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR: ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE AND
THE COMPLEX 123–34 (1994), though Taleb’s work has certainly popularized and refined it.
Taleb’s second edition of the book added a postscript on robustness and fragility which,
while mostly rambling personal musings, contains kernels of the RYF dilemma model. See
TALEB, supra, at 305–29. His latest book, on his concept of “antifragility,” is in the same
vein. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER
(2012). But see N.N. Taleb & R Douady, Mathematical Definition, Mapping, and Detection
of (Anti)Fragility (Aug. 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2124595 (developing a
dense, formal model of antifragility, the property of increasing robustness to volatility).
Although I enjoy and recommend reading Taleb’s work, and it is chock full of wonderful
examples and insights, I find it difficult to extract a coherent theory, likely because Taleb
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The second reason is what I will call the shifted risks problem. Investment in
one type of fail-safe strategy might enhance its contribution to robustness but shift
more risk to other fail-safe mechanisms not yet ready for the challenge because
their fragilities had been masked by the previous failures of the now-improved
component.133 In the levee example, this could happen if the levee walls are raised
in one area to stop frequent spillovers, but then downstream areas are revealed to be
unprepared to receive higher flood levels that result as the high water is funneled
downstream.134 Their fragility was masked by the fragility of the upstream levee.
The third reason is what I will call the failure cascade problem. As system
organization becomes more complex, even slight perturbations could have
cascading and ultimately catastrophic consequences through the tightly
interconnected system.135 A sensor malfunction, for example, could send the wrong
feedback signal to a system actuator that then sets off a chain of miscued signals
down multiple connected feedback chains. In the levee example, if based on
erroneous information an upstream floodgate operator takes the wrong action—say,
by releasing too much floodwater—the effects can literally flow downstream to
trigger actions and consequences of vast proportions.
Finally, there is what I will call the spillover effect problem. Adding a fail-safe
strategy into the system could prove highly effective at addressing the target
problem, but doing so also necessarily alters the system architecture. This
reconfiguration could possibly have unintended effects at seemingly distant or
unrelated places in the system, effects that expose a previously unknown
fragility.136 For example, building a levee system to withstand earthquakes, to
manage river levels along the entire river, and with improved information sources
very well might reduce flood damages, but it also may induce people and
businesses to move into the floodplain so that when a failure does occur it actually
imposes vastly higher damages.
The result of novel perturbations, shifted risks, failure cascades, and spillovers
is the paradox that the “control systems are the primary source of RYF in complex
systems, since the same systems that provide robustness under normal operating
conditions can yield extreme fragilities if they fail or are hijacked.”137 Fragility is,
in this sense, an emergent property: Taken alone, every fail-safe strategy might
openly purports to disdain theory. To be sure, overtheorization is of little practical value, but
undertheorization has its downside as well—observations without theory are just
observations.
133. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 842. Alderson and Doyle observe, for example,
that enhancements in ultraquality computer hardware have shifted fragilities from hardware
failures to software issues, such as exposure to viruses.
134. This kind of upstream-downstream tension is rampant in flood control and
frequently leads to litigation, a current example involving federal government decisions
regarding management of the 2011 Mississippi River flooding. See, e.g., Quebedeaux v.
United States, No. 11-389L, 2013 WL 4479834 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 20, 2013); Big Oak Farms,
Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48 (2012).
135. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 843. The cascade effect is a major study focus in
ecology and ecosystem management sciences. See CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 24, at
672 box 4 (“Trophic cascades are striking illustrations of the links between population
dynamics and ecosystem processes.”).
136. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 843.
137. Id. at 842.
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seem beautifully designed to handle its discrete target problem, but fragility
nonetheless emerges from the system of fail-safe strategies. Adding yet more
fail-safe mechanisms when the control system fails thus only adds to the emergent
effect. As Alderson and Doyle explain:
[T]he emergence of complexity can often be seen as a spiral of new
challenges and opportunities that organisms and/or technologies
exploit, but which also lead to new fragilities, often from novel
perturbations. When successful, fragilities are met with increasing
complexity and robustness, which, in turn, creates not only new
opportunities but also new fragilities, and so on. Managing or, ideally,
preventing this “RYF complexity spiral” remains a central challenge in
engineering, medicine, and human society.138
This RYF complexity spiral effect goes far in explaining what has in other
contexts, particularly that of the financial sector, been referred to as “systemic
risk.” Although there is no universal definition of financial systemic risk, two
leading scholars on the topic, Iman Anabtawi and Steven Schwarcz, adopt one that
captures the core problem:
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a
chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or

138. Id. (footnote omitted). Cast at a much larger social scale, archaeologist Joseph
Tainter’s work on societal collapse in which he postulates, based on extensive research on
past societal-scale collapses, that social systems become more complex as they solve
successive problems, and that eventually bearing the load of this increasing complexity itself
becomes a problem requiring problem solving, which yields yet more complexity, and so on.
Eventually the net benefit of more problem solving (i.e., of more complexity) becomes
negative, and the society spirals into collapse. See JOSEPH A. TAINTER, THE COLLAPSE OF
COMPLEX SOCIETIES (1988); Joseph Tainter, Social Complexity and Sustainability,
3 ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 91 (2006). Tainter’s work has been profoundly influential,
particularly in its challenge to the idea that so-called sustainable development is a possibility.
See Karl W. Butzer, Collapse, Environment, and Society, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3632
(2012) (without mentioning Tainter, arguing that past societal collapses are most attributable
to incompetent governance, war, and pestilence, and that modern states are more equipped to
handle these forces and thus less subject to collapse); Samuel Alexander, Resilience Through
Simplification: Revisiting Tainter’s Theory of Collapse (Simplicity Inst. Report 12h, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2095648 (challenging Tainter’s gloomy conclusion that
sustainable development is not sustainable, arguing that “voluntary simplification” can
reduce the complexity burden). In any case, Tainter’s work is not focused on the local shocksystem failure problem of systemic risk taken up next in the text and which is my primary
concern, so I do not weigh in on the explanatory value of his theory. On the other hand, if
there is anything to Tainter’s theory, high systemic risk—that is, small shocks frequently
leading to cascading failures in law and other social systems—is likely one indicia of a
society passing the collapse tipping point he describes.
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decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financialmarket price volatility.139
In less formal terms, they describe systemic risk as the propensity of the system
“to transmit a localized adverse economic shock throughout the financial system,
amplifying it in the process.”140 Importantly, systemic risk theory emphasizes that it
is not the size of the shock that matters most in triggering such a failure, as “even
small random fluctuations may lead to full cascades if critical conditions are
met.”141 Rather, “systemic risk depends much more on ingredients such as the
network structure, the safety margin and threshold distribution.”142 The shock
matters, but system organization matters more. Indeed, “[t]he threat is complexity
itself.”143
Legal scholars dating back to the 1980s have written about systemic risk in
financial systems,144 but the recent global financial crisis has spawned a plethora of
work on the topic focused on understanding system-wide effects. In their most
recent work, for example, Anabtawi and Schwarcz develop a theory of the
mechanisms of systemic risk. Although they do not adopt a complexity science
model to explain these mechanisms, they do identify what they call the complexity
of the financial system as being a result of, among other things, its structure as “a
complex ‘network’ comprised of institutions, or ‘nodes,’ that are both
interconnected and interactive.”145 They dig deeper into financial system
complexity, discussing the many ways in which the institutions are connected and
the feedback effects that can lead to a “domino model of contagion.”146 Another
legal scholar working on systemic risk in the financial system, Lawrence Baxter,
more rigorously employs complexity science to explain the system’s increasing
complexity and the resulting exposure to fragility and cascading failures.147

139. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1353 (alteration in original) (quoting
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008)).
140. Id. at 1355–56.
141. Claudio J. Tessone, Antonios Garas, Beniamino Guerra & Frank Schweitzer, How
Big Is Too Big? Critical Shocks for Systemic Failure Cascades, 151 J. STAT. PHYSICS 765,
765 (2013).
142. Id. at 782; see also MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 255–57 (explaining system form as
the channel for cascading failures).
143. MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank
Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 560–61 (1989) (“[T]he goal of
bank regulation, to prevent losses to the banking system as a result of bank failure, makes the
regulatory system overinvested in particular banks whose failure poses systemic risks.”);
Michael Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Remarks, 1987 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 303, 308 (“What we should be concerned about is systemic risk—the risk arising
from the systems of the international market as such—not the risk which relates to the
individual investor or even an individual institution. Given the size of today’s predominant
financial players, the failure of one could affect the whole market.”).
145. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1371.
146. Id. at 1371–72.
147. Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of
Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 852–68 (2012); see
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Although not framed in the lexicon of the RYF dilemma model, much of what
these legal scholars have to say resonates in Alderson’s and Doyle’s lament that
“almost nothing appears sustainable in the long run, and catastrophic cascading
fragilities seem increasingly commonplace.”148
What is largely missing from the legal scholarship on systemic risk in the
financial system, however, is an appreciation of the RYF complexity spiral and
law’s role in it. Anabtawi and Schwarcz, for example, position their work as
identifying the financial system failures that led to the crisis and aim to “show that
government can disrupt the transmission of systemic risk by addressing these
failures.”149 Much of their work is devoted to proposing “policy tools for correcting
such failures.”150 This is all well and good—it has to be thought about—but as the
RYF dilemma model shows, it must be thought about with the RYF complexity
spiral in mind, and not only for the financial system, but also for the legal system.
In other words, as we invent and implement regulatory fail-safe measures are we
unwittingly feeding the RYF complexity spiral not just in the financial system, but
in the legal system as well?
With the exception of Baxter—who may be the exception because he uses a
complexity science perspective—legal scholars of systemic risk do not anticipate
this paradox. Baxter, however, recognizes that the many problems he and others
identify in the structure of the financial system are just the tip of the iceberg:
[T]he problem is even deeper and more paradoxical because an
additional dimension of complexity has also begun to manifest itself in
the form of “regulatory complexity.” Regulatory complexity stems not
only from the huge volume of new regulations and regulators being
hurled at the financial industry in an attempt to reduce the risk of
financial instability, but also from the inherent contradictions in our
public policy objectives, overlaps in agency missions, and the ebb and
flow of political accountability that applies to regulators.151

also Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779
(2011) (emphasizing interconnectedness); Dimitrios Bisias, Mark Flood, Andrew W. Lo &
Stavros Valavanis, A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics (U.S. Dep’t of Treasury Office of
Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 0001, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Documents/OFRwp0001_BisiasFloodLoValavanis_ASurveyOfSystemic
RiskAnalytics.pdf (although not explicitly adopting a complexity science analysis, detailing
the numerous interconnected components of the financial system leading to systemic risk).
148. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 843.
149. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1352.
150. Id. at 1381.
151. See Baxter, supra note 147, at 863–64 (footnotes omitted). Lynn Stout has more
directly blamed legal failure—specifically, an obscure 2000 federal statute changing the
rules for derivatives trading—for the financial system crisis, concluding that “the credit
crisis was not due primarily to changes in the markets, it was due to changes in the law.”
Lynn A. Stout, The Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ
Research Paper No. 11-05, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1770082. Although I
do not have sufficient expertise in financial system regulation to evaluate claims like this, it
is perfectly consistent with the RYF model that relatively minor tinkering within the
complex financial regulatory system could lead to a cascade of failures.

592

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:559

Although Baxter does not develop the idea further, he clearly is on to something
if one puts any stock in the RYF dilemma model. As I have suggested above, the
legal system is in essence a social system for producing fail-safe mechanisms to
manage systemic risk in other social systems (and within law).152 As Baxter
suggests, the paradoxical effect of “hurling” these fail-safes without attention to
their complexity effects can be to add to rather than decrease systemic risk.153 But
even his focus is on how these regulatory fail-safes affect systemic risk of the other
systems, whereas my focus is on their effects on systemic risk in the legal
system.154 Given the root cause of systemic risk, there is no reason to believe that
the financial system is alone among social and economic systems in being
susceptible to systemic risk, or that the legal system is immune to it. Some level of
systemic risk is present in all complex adaptive systems, and the legal system
arguably is as tightly interconnected and interdependent as any other. So when we
invent regulatory fail-safes and “hurl” them at other social systems, we must also
be mindful of managing their effects on the legal system that produced them.155

152. See supra Part IV.A.
153. See Baxter, supra note 147, at 863–64. In their study of railway disasters, Lloyd
Burton and M. Jude Egan describe the “hurling” response that often follows railway
accidents as “reactive legislation, which will once again lead to reactive regulation.” Lloyd
Burton & M. Jude Egan, Courting Disaster: Systemic Failures and Reactive Responses in
Railway Safety Regulation, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533, 550 (2011) (emphasis
omitted).
154. Similarly, Aviv Pichhadze has developed a theory of “regulatory systemic risk” that
“arises from long-term imbalances that result from regulatory initiatives that are premised on
a distorted understanding of market realities.” Aviv Pichhadze, Regulatory Systemic Risk in
US Securities Regulation, LAW & FIN. MARKETS REV., May 2011, at 176, 176. While
potentially an important observation for understanding financial market failure, the problem
he identifies is not about systemic risk in the regulatory system itself, but how poorly
designed regulatory systems—that is, ones not aligned with “market realities”—can
contribute to systemic risk in the financial system. Good alignment with “market realities,”
however, will not necessarily eliminate systemic risk in the regulatory system; indeed, it
could increase or decrease legal systemic risk depending on how the regulatory system is
designed to align with the market systems.
155. My brother and I suggested a dynamic something like the RYF complexity spiral at
work in the legal system in an article we published many years ago. See J.B. Ruhl & Harold
J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity
Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law
Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 461–67 (1997). We argued that a new law
might respond adequately to its target policy problem, but that spillover effects could
generate other social problems, thus triggering new law initiatives, and so on into a “cycle of
law” that builds “structural complexity” which, if the cycle runs unabated, “reaches levels of
interconnectedness and intensity that pose the problem of increasing vulnerability to
collapse.” Id. at 456, 467. Complexity science was nascent at the time, and our model leaned
heavily on anthropological theory—for example, TAINTER, supra note 138. Having the
benefit of over a decade of advancements in complexity science, I find the RYF model a
more complete theoretical home for examining the spiral toward increasing complexity in
legal systems.
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V. MANAGEMENT
Given that the legal system’s organized complexity necessary for robustness is
also what gives rise to the system’s fragility, the two properties are stuck in the
perpetual paradox of the RYF dilemma: any effort to reduce fragility by reducing
organization would also reduce robustness, but increasing organization to increase
robustness also increases fragility. The trick is to not fall into the RYF complexity
spiral. As Alderson and Doyle suggest, without attention to this dilemma and the
potential to enter its spiral, “[i]n the worst case, we might build increasingly
complex and incomprehensible systems that will eventually fail completely yet
cryptically.”156 Clearly, then, for law as for other social systems, “we need to better
manage the tradeoff between functional robustness and emergent fragility.”157
While no management strategy will completely overcome the intrinsic RYF
dilemma, Alderson and Doyle believe “we should be able to minimize the potential
risk of catastrophic failure.”158 They recognize, however, that “there is little
consensus on even the most basic strategies to avoid this in real-world
networks.”159 The legal system offers a prime example, with legal scholarship
mired in countless debates over what to do to improve its performance.
Leaning heavily on Alderson and Doyle’s theory thus far, I argue here that their
RYF dilemma model provides tremendous insight for building more consensus on
systemic risk management strategies for the legal system. Note that I use the term
management and not control. I do so to capture the necessary orientation for even
beginning to think about influencing risk levels within legal systems. Direct,
proactive control is for all practical purposes beyond our grasp. To be sure, we do
have the power to intervene, but that’s not the same as control—indeed, our power
of intervention is part of the problem, isn’t it? The difficulty of achieving control of
a complex adaptive system
is rooted in the fact that two independent factors contribute to
controllability, each with its own layer of unknown: (1) the system’s
architecture, represented by the network encapsulating which
components interact with each other; and (2) the dynamical rules that
capture the time-dependent interactions between the components. Thus,
progress has been possible only in systems where both layers are well
mapped . . . .160
My premise is that we have not yet “well mapped” both of these layers for our
legal system. Research like that by Katz and others is advancing our knowledge for
the architecture layer, but it is still quite nascent. Our knowledge of the dynamical
rules layer is even more primitive. We may like to think we know how the legal
system works and have it under our control, but then what explains legal-system

156. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 851.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Yang-Yu Liu, Jean-Jacques Slotine & Albert-László Barabási, Controllability of
Complex Networks, 473 NATURE 167, 167 (2011).
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meltdowns? Rather, at most we can hope to design, monitor, learn, and respond
with more design, optimistically thinking we know enough to adaptively manage
legal systemic risk problems over time.
As a starting point for doing so, consider the original question: How would you
design a legal system to be robust? What does a robust system look like—how does
one assemble all the elements into a system architecture that makes it robust and
minimizes systemic risk? Alderson and Doyle summarize the prototype of such a
system:
1) They are highly modular (versus integrated); 2) they use diverse
components that are imperfect (versus perfect); 3) they have late
(versus early) binding of functionality. This allows for 4) a diversity of
evolvable (versus frozen) capabilities and behavior; and 5) these
systems have fast (versus slow) pace of change, and adaptive (versus
preplanned) behavior via distributed (versus centralized) control, with
extensive use of feedback.161
This set of attributes emphasizes two overarching themes. First, of the qualities
of robustness, the prototype stresses modularity, scalability, and evolvability over
reliability and efficiency. Second, of the fail-safe techniques, the prototype stresses
redundancy, sensors, and feedback over ultraquality components. The core idea is
to avoid constructing a rigid, highly integrated network of ultraquality,
homogenous components with few sensors and centralized system actuators. Such a
system might be robust for certain purposes, but it also is more likely to be
susceptible to catastrophic failure cascades if a component fails—it is a short,
direct, and unchallenging route up the few feedback loops to the centralized system
actuator. Investing in component perfection and cutting out redundancy and other
system “fat” in the quest for efficiency thus may seem prudent when everything is
going smoothly, but may come back to haunt when a storm approaches. Instead,
decentralized but extensive feedback networks hooked up to a modular and diverse
array of system actuators are more likely to cut off a cascading failure chain,
because more system actuators are available for receiving alerts, feedback can be
rerouted, and system components can be switched out. The key is to be mindful of
the potential for buildup of organized complexity in such a system by building in a
sensor subsystem that looks internally for evidence of systemic risk.
Paradoxically, therefore, the success strategy for managing systemic risk in
complex social systems is about investing in some inefficiency and sloppiness as
well as self-monitoring. To be sure, it is not as if such a system has zero systemic
risk—that is not possible. Rather, this kind of system is built around the assumption
of inherent systemic risk and is designed to be on the watch for it and spring into
action when signs of danger surface. Obviously, reliability, efficiency, and quality
matter, and some hierarchy of system actuators may be necessary, but if the costs
of system failure are potentially catastrophic, design for systemic risk management
should be a priority. Through a case study and exploration of risk management
techniques, this Part explores how to implement such a design priority.

161. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 841.
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A. Legal Failure Case Study–The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
The Deepwater Horizon disaster provides a rich context for translating this
theory into practice. Although it may seem unusual to use an oil well blowout as an
example of legal systemic risk when most of the legal scholarship on systemic risk
focuses on financial systems, there are several good reasons for doing so. One is to
provide a more generalizable theory of legal systemic risk by demonstrating that it
applies outside the context of financial system regulation. Another reason is that, to
be candid, it is easier in the Deepwater Horizon context to isolate and explain the
legal systemic risk than it is in the financial crisis context. As legal systems go, the
financial regulation system is dauntingly complex, and a full grasp is far outside the
scope of coverage here. Deepwater Horizon represents a smaller-scale failure, to be
sure, but nonetheless the story illustrates how discrete modules of the legal system
(here, offshore oil drilling regulation) can crash catastrophically.
Also, and perhaps most saliently, the Deepwater Horizon event more clearly
defines a critically important point for my purposes—that often times the
contribution of legal systemic risk to social or economic catastrophe is masked by
more visible and discrete causal forces, such as technological failures, human
errors, and corporate malfeasance, stemming from systemic risk in the systems law
regulates. As Alderson and Doyle put it, “‘human error,’ particularly when
persistent, is often actually a symptom of system design problems.”162 We must,
therefore, “look[] past the proximal cause of any one observable failure to see
whether it has merely triggered a fragility inherent to the system, one that should
really be addressed with a system solution.”163 Disaster policy experts Lloyd
Burton and M. Jude Egan put this in practical terms in their discussion of the
regulatory system failure lessons learned from a commuter rail disaster caused
proximately by human error:
Human operator error is typically the first—and most agencies and
firms hope—the last organizational refuge after an accident. The logic
is that if the human operator failed in his duties—to err, after all, is
human—then the system itself must not be broken. Blaming the human
operator, and, if not the human operator, then malfunctioning
equipment, tends to shield both industries and regulatory agencies from
the costly and time-consuming process of governmental and public
accident investigations that might reveal deliberate indifference and
therefore necessitate systemic reforms—perhaps even some
resignations.164
With those premises in mind, for my purposes all one needs to know about the
Deepwater Horizon spill event itself is that it happened and was a spill of epic
proportions, which everyone knows.165 It was, in other words, the kind of event the
legal system was supposed to help avoid. As extensive and damaging as the spill

162.
163.
164.
165.

Alderson & Doyle, supra note 1, at 850.
Id.
Burton & Egan, supra note 153, at 536.
But if not, see DEEP WATER, supra note 2, at 173.
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was, though, my concern here is what happened before the spill. In that respect,
moreover, it is not necessary for me to describe and evaluate in detail the
individual, corporate, and technological failures that contributed to causing the
event; rather, my focus is on how the legal system regulating deep-water drilling
failed in managing the risk of those events by failing to manage its own systemic
risk. In other words, was the legal system designed robustly to manage legal
systemic risk, and if not, how can it be reformed to improve performance in that
respect?
1. Prelude
The 33,000-ton, $350 million Deepwater Horizon drilling platform was
considered the flagship of Transocean’s fleet of offshore drilling rigs.166 On April
20, 2010, under contract with BP America, it sat 4992 feet above BP’s Macondo
well, which at the time was six weeks behind schedule and $58 million over
budget.167 Early that morning, and several times throughout the day, Halliburton
Company engineers contracted by BP reported that they had successfully cemented
the well to control pressure.168 They were wrong.
The story of what went wrong on the rig takes up many pages, but according to
the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling (“Commission”) the immediate causes were “the product of several
individual missteps and oversights by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean,” all
centering on the failure of the cement at the bottom of the well, the mud in the well
and the riser piping, and the blowout preventer to contain hydrocarbon pressures in
the well.169 But there was more to it than that. Moving past blaming human errors
for proximate causes, the Commission dug into the root causes and found among
them the legal system:
The blowout was not the product of a series of aberrational decisions
made by rogue industry or government officials that could not have
been anticipated or expected to occur again. Rather, the root causes are
systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices and
government policies, might well recur. The missteps were rooted in
systemic failures by industry management (extending beyond BP to
contractors that serve many in the industry), and also by failures of
government to provide effective regulatory oversight of offshore
drilling.170

166. Id. at 1–2.
167. See id. at 1–3.
168. See id. at 1–5
169. See id. at 115.
170. Id. at 122. Groups of legal scholars from the Center for Progressive Reform have
also published two studies of the blowout reaching similar conclusions. See ALYSON
FLOURNOY, SIDNEY SHAPIRO, WILLIAM ANDREEN, THOMAS MCGARITY & JAMES GOODWIN,
CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE BP CATASTROPHE: WHEN HOBBLED LAW AND HOLLOW
REGULATION LEAVE AMERICANS UNPROTECTED (2011) [hereinafter BP CATASTROPHE];
ALYSON FLOURNOY, WILLIAM ANDREEN, REBECCA BRATSPIES, HOLLY DOREMUS, VICTOR
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To be sure, any failure by government to provide effective regulatory oversight
can itself have many root causes, including inadequate resources, lack of political
support, industry resistance, and human incompetence, all of which were in play in
offshore drilling regulation.171 It is beyond the scope of my coverage to detail each
of these causal forces. But the Commission also zeroed in on a root cause of
interest to me: the design architecture of the regulatory regime. Three features of
that structure figured prominently in the Commission’s analysis, and each maps
easily onto the RYF dilemma model’s lesson for how not to manage systemic risk.
First, the evolution of the nation’s offshore drilling policy starting in the 1980s
consolidated two conflicting system functions—getting energy and revenue out of
the Gulf versus ensuring worker and environmental protection—into one system
actuator—the Department of the Interior’s Minerals Management Service
(MMS).172 From the time it was conceived in the early 1980s through the time of
the Deepwater Horizon blowout, this single agency “would increasingly struggle to
keep up with the pace of industry expansion, while juggling four distinct
responsibilities—offshore leasing, revenue collection and auditing, permitting and
operational safety, and environmental protection—requiring different skill sets and
cultures.”173 While perhaps promoting efficiency, this integrated, centralized
regulatory structure sacrificed the modularity and diversity of components and
actuators needed for management of systemic risk.174
Second, the MMS failed over time to manage its own RYF complexity spiral.
Soon into its tenure, the MMS embarked, as it was supposed to, on regulation of
the industry—to generate fail-safe measures. For example, MMS subjected oil and
gas activities to “an array of prescriptive safety regulations” with “hundreds of
pages of technical requirements.”175 But the MMS “came progressively to suffer
from serious deficiencies of organization and management.”176 It lacked “a formal,
bureau-wide compilation of rules, regulations, policies, or practices” and had “no
formal process to promote standardization, consistency, and operational efficiency”
across its many district offices.177 In short, the MMS lost control of its increasingly
organized complexity, which made it less effective at managing the industry’s
complexity.

FLATT, ROBERT GLICKSMAN, JOEL MINTZ, DANIEL ROHLF, AMY SINDEN, RENA STEINZOR,
JOSEPH TOMAIN, SANDRA ZELLMER & JAMES GOODWIN, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM,
REGULATORY BLOWOUT: HOW REGULATORY FAILURES MADE THE BP DISASTER POSSIBLE,
AND HOW THE SYSTEM CAN BE FIXED TO AVOID A RECURRENCE (2010) [hereinafter
REGULATORY BLOWOUT]. The national commission investigating the financial crisis
similarly concluded that “widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved
devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets.” FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note
2, at xviii (emphasis omitted).
171. DEEP WATER, supra note 2, passim.
172. See id. at 63–67.
173. Id. at 67.
174. See Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1107–09, 1126–28 (2011) (discussing this efficiencymodularity tradeoff in MMS structure).
175. DEEP WATER, supra note 2, at 68.
176. Id. at 78.
177. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Third, the MMS essentially shut down its system sensors and feedback
networks. One deactivated system sensor was NEPA, which as previously
described is designed to promote agency predecisional consideration of
environmental impacts.178 A combination of congressional and MMS actions,
however, changed the NEPA default rule for drilling in the Gulf to one of
“categorical exclusion” from MMS review of industry activities unless the agency
identified “extraordinary circumstances.”179 In the cross-purposes structure of the
agency, however, leasing personnel pressured science personnel against finding
extraordinary circumstances even as drilling pushed into deeper and deeper Gulf
waters.180 As a result, the “MMS performed no meaningful NEPA review of the
potentially significant adverse environmental consequences associated with its
permitting for drilling of BP’s exploratory Macondo well.”181 Similarly, although
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) required industry to prepare, and the MMS to
review, oil spill response plans including procedures to be followed in case of
worst case spills,182 the process deteriorated into a farce. BP’s plan for the
Macondo well, for example, postulated 250,000 barrels as the worst conceivable
spill (the spill was well over 4.5 million barrels), identified sea lions, sea otters, and
walruses as among the species in the Gulf (they are not), and copied extensively
from government resource agency websites.183 MMS practices over time neutered
numerous other environmental impact review laws,184 to the point that the
Commission concluded that “[n]otwithstanding statutory promises of layers of
required environmental scrutiny . . . none of these laws resulted in site-specific
review of the drilling operations of the Macondo well.”185
The combined effect of these three features of offshore drilling regulation was to
erode the legal system’s capacity to manage its own systemic risk. The system was
integrated (not modular), centralized (not decentralized), with one actuator (not
many diverse actuators); it generated organized regulatory complexity to the point
of falling into the RYF complexity spiral; and it snipped off all its environmental
alert sensors. When drilling began to expand into deeper Gulf waters, the MMS
might have at some threshold sensed that something was fundamentally different. It
might have paused to examine itself, not only the industry, to explore whether its
systems were operating robustly. But the entire system was free-falling in a failure
cascade long before the Deepwater Horizon blowout—it was just a matter of when,
not if. To be sure, other causal factors were in play, ranging from inadequate
funding of the MMS to a myriad of failures with the industry,186 but if law is
expected to manage systemic risk in other systems, the regulatory structure that
evolved over time for offshore drilling could not have helped. Indeed, it is as if it
was designed to fail catastrophically.
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See supra text accompanying notes 105–07.
DEEP WATER, supra note 2, at 81–82.
See id. at 82.
Id.
See id. at 83–84.
See id. at 84.
See id. at 79–84.
Id. at 84 (emphasis in original).
See id. passim.
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2. Postmortem
It is all too easy to look back on Deepwater Horizon and cast stones at the
MMS, but the root problem wasn’t just with the MMS or people within the
agency—it was the system design that contributed to preventing the MMS from
extracting itself from the slow burn to catastrophe, or even to see that it was in the
failure cascade at all. Encouragingly, regulatory reform proposals following the
blowout point in the right direction for reversing many of those design flaws.187
First, within weeks after the Deepwater Horizon blowout, Secretary of the
Interior Ken Salazar put in motion an initiative to reorganize the MMS into three
separate entities: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), the Bureau of
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the Office of Natural
Resources Revenue.188 His instincts map well onto RYF systemic risk management
theory. Disaggregating the MMS into the three agencies, each aligned with a
different policy purpose, promotes a system modularity that better matches
actuators with system functions and enables construction of more effective sensor
and feedback networks.189 Of course, funding, political oversight and pressure, and
a host of other factors will determine how well the new design performs, but as a
design matter the new structure is superior to the former.
There has been no shortage of proposals from the new agencies, Congress, legal
scholars, and policy organizations for where to go from there. Not surprisingly, one
major thrust has been to restore and strengthen the role of NEPA, OPA, and other
environmental impact review laws in the offshore drilling regime.190 This instinct
also maps well onto RYF systemic risk management theory. Particularly with the
reconstituted agency structure, activating a stronger sensor and feedback network
linked to the environmental agency will better enable that system actuator to carry
out its functions.
While there are many details to work out to implement the reconstituted actuator
structure and the revival of a sensor and feedback network, these two reform thrusts
are not so difficult to conceptualize and design. By contrast, other reform proposals
focus on making the offshore drilling regulatory system more adaptive and more
precautionary. These two themes, while consistent with RYF theory, impose
difficult design problems.
The call for a more adaptive system focuses on regulatory designs that allow
system actuators to respond adeptly to changes in the offshore drilling operating
environment. This approach is in the bull’s eye of RYF systemic risk management
theory, but is also the most difficult to operationalize in our political system. The
point of designing systems around modularity, scalability, evolvability, sensors, and

187. I am for these purposes not focusing attention on tort and other remedial reform
possibilities. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills
and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1863.
188. DEEP WATER, supra note 2, at 55.
189. The Department has charted the division of functions at An Overview of the
Assignment of Regulations Between the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, BSEE.GOV, http://www.bsee.gov
/uploadedFiles/ChartBSEEBOEMRegulatoryAuthorities.pdf.
190. See, e.g., REGULATORY BLOWOUT, supra note 170.
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feedback is to make them adaptive to shocks and local failures so the big failures can
be averted. Clearly, as the Commission found, advances in drilling technology and
industry expansion into the deep Gulf outstripped adaptive capacity in the MMS,191
so it is natural to ask the BOEM and BSEE to be more adaptive. More generally, a
rising theme in legal and policy scholarship on regulation is that agencies must be
enabled to practice “adaptive management” to respond to change in the systems they
regulate.192 Few disagree with that in principle, but putting adaptive management
into action has proven very difficult.193 To put it bluntly, and without going into
extensive detail here, with its intense focus on public participation in and judicial
review of agency decisions, the conventional regulatory state is not designed for
agencies to move quickly and adaptively.194 I leave the design of administrative law
for adaptive management to another day;195 suffice it to say that it is a different legal
systemic risk problem, one going well beyond offshore drilling regulation in its
scope and potential for failure.
The call for a more precautionary system also is consistent with systemic risk
management theory, which emphasizes design for a “safety margin” as essential,196
particularly for dealing with the uncertainty of catastrophe.197 But most of the legal
scholars advocating this design feature can be read for the most part as demanding
more and stronger regulation of the drilling industry.198 Indeed, the BOEM and BSEE

191. DEEP WATER, supra note 2, at 73 (“MMS was unable to maintain up-to-date
technical drilling-safety requirements to keep up with industry’s rapidly evolving deepwater
technology.”).
192. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 424, 427–31 (2010).
193. See Craig R. Allen, Jospeh J. Fontaine, Kevin L. Pope & Ahjond S. Garmestani,
Adaptive Management for a Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1339, 1341 (2011)
(“[D]espite an illustrious theoretical history there has remained imperfect realization of
adaptive management in [the] real world . . . .”); Craig R. Allen & Lance H. Gunderson,
Pathology and Failure in the Design and Implementation of Adaptive Management, 92 J.
ENVTL. MGMT. 1379, 1380 (2011) (“The implementation of adaptive management has
proven to be difficult.”); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species
Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 50, 54 (2001) (“[S]kepticism about adaptive management comes from the
lack of success stories to date.”); Carl J. Walters, Is Adaptive Management Helping to Solve
Fisheries Problems?, 36 AMBIO 304, 304 (2007) (“[A]daptive management has been
radically less successful than one would expect from its intuitive appeal.”).
194. See J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 21, 34–53 (2005).
195. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for
Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014).
196. See Tessone et al., supra note 141, passim.
197. See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901 (2011) (emphasizing
precautionary principles to design for catastrophe uncertainty in regulatory systems).
198. One exception is Lori Bennear’s proposal to require offshore drilling operators to
deposit an up-front bond to be refunded upon safe completion of the drilling activity. The bond
would be priced at the estimated costs of a significant accident, but to promote better practices
the price would be discounted for firms that earn high scores on independent third-party safety
evaluations. See Lori S. Bennear, Beyond Belts and Suspenders: Promoting Private Risk
Management in Offshore Drilling, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN, supra note 2, at 49, 61–64.
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have promulgated a comprehensive regulatory reform rule introducing many new
regulatory requirements.199 Surely, better management of systemic risk in offshore
drilling was needed, and this new regulatory regime may deliver it. The question will
be whether the new rules, as precautionary and powerful as they may be toward
offshore drilling practices, initiate the kind of RYF complexity spiral in the legal
system that MMS found itself in. Having a lot of regulations doesn’t do much good if
they are unmanageable. The instinct to hurl regulations at a problem is at its highest
following a catastrophic failure cascade, but some lesson has to be taken from the fact
that systemic risk in the legal system contributed to the catastrophe. MMS lost control
of its own regulatory complexity; the BOEM and BSEE must avoid making the same
mistake. There will be failures in offshore drilling, and the BOEM and BSEE must be
careful not to react in knee-jerk fashion by inventing new fail-safes to paste on to the
existing regulatory system without thinking about the systemic risk effects doing so
generates within the regulatory system itself.
B. Moving Beyond Precaution and Adaptation
Although adaptation and precaution are, with due care, appropriate design
principles for managing legal systemic risk, they are not enough. As displayed in the
post-blowout reform proposals, the focus in both cases is on the regulatory problem,
not the regulatory system. Of course, one could turn adaptation and precaution
inward on the regulatory system as well, focusing on managing legal systemic risk.
Ultimately, however, regulatory design must pay attention to how the regulatory
problem and the regulatory system coevolve by using what Burton and Eagan, in
their study of railway disasters, call Interdependent Systems Analysis (ISA).200
Resonating in complexity science research on “system of systems,”201 ISA
focuses inward on the regulatory system not failure by failure, but over the history of
failures as components of the larger system. Under ISA, “disparate operational
accidents are seen as taking place under a given set of rules, and the comparative
analysis of individual accidents occurring within the same regulatory context may
begin to reveal how the legal and regulatory context may be at fault.”202 ISA uses
timelines in which failures in the other social system—the one the legal system is
designed to regulate—are mapped along with legislative, regulatory, judicial and
other legal events in the relevant regulatory context and links between them
explored, so as to constantly keep legal systemic risk in the scope of overall
systemic risk management.203 Every failure in financial systems, offshore drilling,
and railway transportation has root causes, but assessing root causes one failure at a

199. See 76 Fed. Reg. 64,431 (Oct. 18, 2011) (350-page rulemaking comprehensively
overhauling regulation of offshore drilling).
200. Burton & Egan, supra note 153, at 558–61.
201. See, e.g., Mary Ann Allison, Ron Batdorf, Hao Chen, Hòa Generazio, Harcharanjit
Singh & Steve Tucker, New England Complex Sys. Inst., The Characteristics and Emerging
Behaviors of System of Systems (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://necsi.edu/education/one
week/winter05/NECSISoS.pdf (discussing the study of interactions between complex
systems).
202. Burton & Egan, supra note 153, at 558.
203. See id.
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time obscures systemic risk, in particular systemic risk within the regulatory system
designed to manage systemic risk in these other social systems. Incorporating ISA in
legal systems thus is a much-needed design feature for managing legal systemic risk.
Institutionalizing ISA thus should be a central goal of legal systemic risk
management reform.
More holistically, managing legal systemic risk will require incorporating the
kind of proactive, risk-based performance approach some policy analysts are
suggesting for the financial system,204 offshore drilling regulation,205 and natural
disaster planning.206 Principal in this regard are stress-testing mechanisms,
independent watchdog entities, and risk portfolio assessment. In their evaluation of
financial regulation, for example, Dimitrio Bisias and colleagues at the Department
of the Treasury recommend using a series of “forward looking risk measurement”
analytics and stress tests to keep watch on financial systemic risk.207 Similarly, Hari
Osofsky explores safety drills and regional citizen advisory groups for offshore
drilling regulatory reform,208 and Jim Chen outlines ways of incorporating modern
financial risk portfolio theory into disaster planning.209 All of these proposals focus
on the regulatory problem, but there is no reason to conclude they cannot be adapted
to the legal system. Why should we design forward-looking risk measurement, stress
testing, and risk portfolios for the social systems law regulates but not for the legal
system itself? Rather, as Tony Arnold and Lance Gunderson have put it, “the legal
system itself should develop and improve its own feedback loops to evaluate and
adapt to the impacts of legal decisions and actions.”210
To be sure, we are much further along in designing proactive, risk-based tools for
regulatory problems, because we have devised metrics and analytics for many of the
relevant social systems. We have not made similar advancements in the study of
legal systemic risk, largely because legal failure is usually treated as a one-off
problem cured by one-off, targeted legal fail-safe reform. Researchers like Katz and
others who are beginning to explore legal complexity empirically, rather than just
theoretically, thus represent a critical movement toward the goal of getting a handle
on legal systemic risk. For now, however, the RYF dilemma model compellingly
establishes that legal systemic risk is best managed by designing legal institutions
and instruments to incorporate modularity, scalability, evolvability, sensors, and
feedback.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to hurl regulation at a policy problem and, if the problem persists, hurl
some more. It is the legal system’s job to manage risk in other social systems, and

204. See, e.g., Bisias et al., supra note 147.
205. See Osofsky, supra note 174, at 1122–30.
206. See Jim Chen, Postmodern Disaster Theory (Mich. State Univ. Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 11-17, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141591.
207. See Bisias et al., supra note 147, at 74–103.
208. See Osofsky, supra note 174, at 1122–37.
209. See Chen, supra note 206, at 64–97.
210. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Law & Resilience,
43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10426, 10441 (2013).
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hurling regulation is one way to do it. As we know from the financial crisis,
Deepwater Horizon, and countless catastrophes before them, however, regulation
doesn’t just not always work, many times it is part of what causes a failure cascade
within and beyond the legal system. Even when regulation is not hurled, but rather
is carefully thought out to manage systemic risk in other social systems, attention
thus must also be paid to managing systemic risk within the legal system.
The RYF dilemma model provides several useful instructions in this regard.
First, although building organization into the legal system makes intuitive and
practical sense and at some level is necessary for functionality, left unchecked it
leads inevitably to complexity and, consequently, fragility. Second, responding to
local failures by adding more organization through new fail-safe measures keeps
adding complexity, and thus new conditions of fragility, to the system, leading
potentially to a spiral toward incomprehensibly complex system organization.
Systemic risk—the potential for catastrophic failure cascades—rises in hand with
the complexity spiral. Finally, while systemic risk cannot be brought to zero,
system structures designed around modularity, scalability, evolvability, sensors,
and feedback are best suited to managing systemic risk.
The Deepwater Horizon case study shows how robust the RYF dilemma model
is for legal system design. Of course, no regulatory system could guarantee that
Deepwater Horizon would not have happened or could never happen again; on the
other hand, the regulatory system that was in place practically guaranteed that it
would happen. The structure of offshore drilling regulation prior to the blowout
illustrates many of the RYF dilemma model’s parts in motion, and the reform
proposals since the blowout map well onto the model’s prototype for managing
systemic risk.
The RYF dilemma model also shows how high the stakes are for regulatory
design in three important respects. First, calls for more adaptive regulatory
structures, which will be essential for law to manage systemic risk in other social
systems, necessarily challenge deeply entrenched features of administrative law.
Second, calls for heightened precaution that abound in environmental and other
policy realms, while resonating in systemic risk management theory, must be
implemented without fueling an RYF complexity spiral in the regulatory system.
Without strong precautionary and adaptive capacities, it is difficult to imagine how
the legal system can effectively manage systemic risk in other social systems;
however, building precautionary and adaptive capacities into the legal system raises
a host of challenges for managing systemic risk within the legal system.
Interdependent Systems Analysis should be embedded in regulatory systems,
therefore, to monitor legal systemic risk and its effects on risk in other social
systems, and a broad agenda of proactive, risk-based performance tools should be
built for the regulatory system, not just regulatory problems.
It would be sheer hubris to suggest that my or any set of prescriptions can weed
out all systemic risk from legal systems. Trying to do so would likely be more
dangerous than helpful. But once we recognize that there is such a thing as legal
systemic risk—which if anything has been my goal for this Article—efforts to
manage it are inevitable. Let us do so wisely, with care not to fuel the RYF spiral.

